CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

CHALLENGES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF INDEPENDENCE AND STATE BUILDING IN KOREA AND GEORGIA

ONLINE CONFERENCE, 31 MARCH, 2021

ILIA STATE UNIVERSITY

2022

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COLLECTION OF RESEARCH PAPERS

The articles in this edition were prepared for presentation at the conference "Challenges and Achievements of Independence and State Building in Korea and Georgia", which is part of the project "Georgia and Korea: Parallels in the Historical Experience of Colonialism, Struggle for Independence, Liberation and State Building"[1], on which researchers from Ilia State University in Georgia and Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in the Republic of Korea work together.

Regaining independence after the imperial occupation and annexation proved to be the ultimate political project of Korean and Georgian nations. Political independence led to new types of challenges and opportunities facing both states. Lack of statehood experience, internal and external political, socio-economic and geopolitical challenges became major impediments on the road of building efficient and modern state institutions and strengthening civic political culture of universal human rights, tolerance and equality.

Despite all those hurdles, both countries, though with various success, managed to overcome many challenges facing them in their first years of independence and set goals of consolidating and strengthening their political independence and statehood. While Georgian and Korean state building projects demonstrate many interesting parallels, still two countries vary in their internal and external achievements of modernization and development.

The Major aim of the conference was be to look at the state building projects of Georgian and Korean nations since independence, to evaluate challenges and opportunities facing both countries on their road of independent statehood and to assess possible future trajectories of their development.

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JAPANESE COLONIAL POLICIES: SOCIOECONOMIC SEGREGATION OF THE KOREAN NATION

Prof. Otar Berejiani, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

Abstract

The defeat of the Japanese Empire in World War II brought its colonial dominance on the Korean peninsula to an end. The nation-building of Korea faced many challenges not only due to the geopolitical and ideological rivalry among the world powers, but also because of numerous obstacles from within. A significant hurdle to building an independent nation was the sever socioeconomic segregation of the Korean people, which was the direct result of the Japanese colonial policies. This paper looks at the Japanese educational and economic policies that have contributed to the formation of a wide gap between most of the Korean people and the elite.

The main focus is on the educational ordinances and land ownership policies implemented by the Japanese, as these two policy areas had significant impact on the general population of the Korean peninsula. Understanding the effects of these measures can provide insights into the initial stages of state building after Korea's liberation from the Japanese Colonial rule and even shed a light on some aspects of the contemporary Korean society.

Keywords: *Japanese colonial policies, Korea under annexation, socioeconomic segregation*

The Japanese Empire established Korea as its protectorate in 1905 and paved the way to its full annexation in 1910. The annexation of Korea continued until the Japanese capitulated in World War II in 1945. For four decades, Japan controlled and exploited Korean national resources to achieve Imperialistic goals in the region. The colonial experience profoundly influenced all aspects of Korean society, and its wound lingered for many years—even decades.

During the colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula, the social and economic transformation of the country was accelerated under the guise of modernization. Regarding the socioeconomic segregation of the Korean nation, the colonial policies had a profound impact on the widening gap between the elite and common people. This profound divide lingered in society long after the liberation and has continued to impact social and political life in the following decades.

Education Policies

Building a public education system builds human capital and ensures social cohesion—an important factor in national government. Investment in public education promotes the formation of human capital needed for economic development and can also promote political development, enhancing political sophistication and participation (Tesla 2018). Accordingly, Japan's goal of utilizing the Korean peninsula as its industrial base for regional expansion required literacy among the workforce, while limiting the possibility of enhancing political awareness and participation.

Japan's educational policies in Korea were introduced through four educational ordinances throughout the colonial period. These ordinances reflected the geopolitical context and Japanese military and colonial interests at specific periods of time. Although public education was implemented under the guise of modernization, in reality, these ordinances were aimed at assimilating the Korean people as second-class citizens of the Japanese Empire. According to Pak and Hwan, the educational policies were based on an aggressive form of patriarchy in response to feelings of political and social defeatism, engaging in symbolic displays of power that were systematically degrading to the Koreans (Pak and Hwan 2011).

From 1910 to 1945, the period of annexation of the Korean peninsula, the Japanese colonial government issued four educational ordinances. These ordinances were issued by the Government-General of Korea, a colonial government body, in which all the power was concentrated in the hands of the governor-general (Ku 1985).

Initial goals for education were to achieve control and propagate assimilation ideology to instill conformity among the Korean people. An administrative push for indoctrination of Koreans started when the first educational ordinance was issued by the colonial government in 1911, named "Making Loyal and Good Subjects" in line with the Imperial Rescript on Education (Weiner 1989).

The overall view of the Japanese was that Koreans were developed enough to be taught theoretical subjects; therefore, the basis for a dual schooling system was established—schools for Japanese nationals relocated to Korea and vocational schools for Koreans. Such a policy was implemented to ensure acquisition of much-needed human capital in the expansion of the industrial base for Japan's economic interest while limiting the possibility of sophistication and aspirations for participation among the colonial subjects.

The public schooling policy was based on segregation between the Koreans and the Japanese, and Koreans were not allowed to pursue post-secondary education. The type of education offered to Koreans in common schools was focused on learning the Japanese language and nourishing their sense of duty as colonial subjects. As for secondary schools, the emphasis was on producing semiskilled laborers for the agricultural, industrial, and commercial sectors. Segregated schools highlighted the difference in status between the Japanese and the colonized. Educational policy considered advanced training unsuitable for colonial subjects and stressed primary Japanese language and vocational skills, thus supporting an economic policy that required a skilled workforce (Robinson 1988).

The initial establishment of the public school system by the Japanese was met with resistance and mistrust by the Korean people. The "Japanisation" of schools was seen as an act of aggression aimed at uprooting Korean traditional schools, mostly private, as these were all transformed into public schools by the colonial administration (Woo 1991). The fact that the main aim of these schools was to teach children the Japanese language and raise them to be conscious of being subjects of Japanese Empire fueled a natural resistance to public schooling. Koreans' reluctance to enroll their children in these schools undermined the Japanese goals, and a viable student body could not be formed.

To address this resistance, the Japanese colonial government started implementing drastic measures to boost school enrolment. Force and coercion were used to make Koreans send their children to school. Parents of school-age children were threatened or even sent to jail for refusing school enrolment.

In 1919, the growing resentment and resistance of the Korean people toward Japanese rule and discriminatory policies at all levels exploded into a massive uprising known as the March 1st Movement. The enormous, peaceful demonstration of desire for independence spread throughout

the peninsula and continued for months. Nationwide demonstrations took place at various locations, with as many as a million people coming out to the streets.

The uprising was crushed by the Japanese, with thousands killed and many more jailed; however, the movement exposed the ineffectiveness of the colonial policy. Colonial policy was reassessed, and changes were implemented with conciliatory features. Although the overall governing strategy remained the same, brutal coercion was replaced by a softer and more effective policy of manipulation and co-optation (Robinson 1988).

New administrative policies known as Cultural Rule were introduced following the March 1st uprising. The second education ordinance, issued in 1922, gave nominal equality to Korean schools by placing them on the same level as Japanese schools. The ordinance also abandoned segregation in secondary school systems, allowing Koreans and Japanese students to attend together.

The new policies were successful, considering that the enrolment rate of Korean students in common schools climbed sharply. By the early 1930s, there were about 700,000 students enrolled in 2271 elementary schools across Korea. The fervor to study, a phenomenon largely present in Korean society to date, became apparent—a new movement demanded the establishment of a national university. This demand was met by the Colonial government, and the state-run Keijo Imperial University was established in 1924.

The Koreans, as second-class citizens of the colony, saw opportunities in better education for their children—the possibility for upward mobility on the social ladder. Public schooling became a necessary means to becoming a civil servant, an occupation traditionally highly regarded in Korea. The enthusiasm for study was further fueled by the Japanese administration's strict enrolment criteria for secondary and post-secondary education, resulting in highly competitive admissions processes. However, records indicate that student admissions in secondary-education institutions included a "test of thoughts (ideology)" as part of the admission process (Kim 2020 page 23). Although equality in education opportunities was introduced by the colonial government, in reality, these opportunities were mostly limited to people aligning themselves with the Japanese colonizers.

The Japanese colonial administration's elementary school education ensured ideological

indoctrination to produce loyal subjects who could serve in the administration of the colony. Government-General officials compiled moral textbooks to help create loyal subjects of the emperor, ensure obedience among Koreans, and consolidate its control (Yuh 2010). The curriculum nominally stressed equality of all subjects of the Empire; however, the subtle reinforcement of the subordinate status of Koreans was ever-present.

The education and upward-mobility opportunities created a social group of people willing to be participants and practitioners of Japanese administrative despotism and function as a bureaucratic network, penetrating the lives of ordinary people. Those Koreans who enjoyed upward social mobility and were part of the bureaucratic system of the colonial governance in this period were labeled collaborators. It was only natural that resentment toward this group of people among the general population started to accumulate over the following years and lingered for decades to come.

The third educational ordinance (1938) was issued amid the Sino-Japanese War that broke out in 1937. Due to the war expanding into the Pacific region, the Japanese thought to impose a wartime system in the country and its colonies. This new set of colonial policies effectively ended the period of cultural rule, and the colony was mobilized to support Imperial war efforts. General mobilization and conscription orders were issued in 1939. Through these changes, Korean people were forced into jobs supporting the Japanese troops, and later, over 200,000 young Korean men were forced to join the military and fight alongside the Japanese.

The wartime system brought harsh new measures upon Korean subjects. According to Kim (1996), by this time, Japanese imperialism took the form of militaristic fascism. During this period, Japanese language became compulsory and a requirement for mandatory worship at Shinto shrines was introduced. In 1940, a name-change order was issued that required Koreans to change their names to Japanese names within six months. Koreans who resisted were persecuted and denied bureaucratic services and school enrolment for their children.

The fourth and final education ordinance was issued in 1943. It was an extension of previous orders and essentially transformed schools into commissary bases for recruiting colonial subjects. General school curriculum was abandoned, and emphasis was placed on reciting the Pledge of Imperial Subjects and use of the students as physical laborers in the supply chain for war efforts. Secondary-level students were drafted into the army or as laborers for construction of

military facilities through the *de facto* involuntary "student volunteer system." This ordinance turned the schooling system into military infrastructure to provide labor and soldiers to the Japanese Empire.

Under the brutal wartime governance of the Japanese Empire, the rupture between the majority of the Korean people and those who benefited from the system deepened even further. For many people, the path of compliance or complicity was a way of survival; for others, it was collaboration with the occupant against one's own country.

Land Ownership Policies

Korea had implemented land reform through surveys by the Reform of 1894, during the Joseon dynasty. The Korean administration started an investigation of the lands and issuances of land deeds between 1899 and 1904, but these efforts were cut short when Korea became a protectorate of Japan in 1905. The land ownership system implemented in the late Joseon period is considered modern but was complex and multilayered.

The Korean land ownership structure incorporated rent agents who controlled palace lands and intermediary landowners. The Japanese sought to simplify this complex, multilevel tenancy land ownership system by dividing land into two types: state and private. The new land legislation commercialized land for easier utilization in the capitalist economic system, where investments in land ownership for industries would be seamless.

The Japanese thought it necessary to establish long-term land legislation in Korea to secure the financial foundation of the colony and guarantee Japanese investments (Lee 2014). For this reason, the resident-general, representative of the Japanese government, introduced an important change by abolishing the rule forbidding foreigners from owning land. After implementing this change, the land parcels that had been illegally secured by the Japanese were legally recognized as being owned. The introduction of the Japanese Land Survey on Korean Land was an institutional base for exploitation (Jun and Kim 2017).

During the colonial period, the Japanese financed and provided institutional support for the modernization and development of Korean rice farming. This strategy was aimed at increasing

production to meet the demand of the Japanese market. Korea was chosen as the main rice supplier for Japan, as it had more potential for higher yields compared to Japan, and unlike other colonies, it cultivated the type of rice used as a staple in Japan (Kimura 1995).

The changes implemented prior to annexation and fully implemented during the annexation of Korea resulted in substantial increase of tenancy. The incentives given to landlords to encourage production meant higher rent for tenants, further marginalizing the majority of the Korean population. Most Japanese and Korean landowners raised farm rent by 50 percent, and some even raised rent by as much as 60 to 70 percent (Park 2010). As was the case with the education accessibility, it is obvious that, together with the Japanese landowners, landlords collaborating with the Japanese colonial government were given preferential treatment and endorsements for customary ownerships.

The fast development of rice production contributed to the accumulation of substantial capital among landowners. By 1919, after the March 1st Uprising and introduction of Cultural Rule by the colonial government, landlords and merchants began to take a serious interest in modern industry. Although the main driving force for industrialization was Japanese capital, a minor part was also assigned to Korean capital (Carter 1991).

The establishment of the comparatively affluent elite in Korean society was met with great resentment by the ordinary people, as wealth and prosperity were correlated to collaboration with the colonizer. Many saw pro-Japanese Koreans at that time as villains of contemporary Korean society (Seo 1992). This strong sentiment against the elite was one of the many hurdles Korea had to face after liberation. According to Choong (2009), hatred against Japanese collaborators was one of the factors contributing to revolutionary turmoil after the liberation.

Conclusion

This paper outlines two main directions of colonial policy as important factors contributing to the socioeconomic segregation of Korean society: education policies and land ownership reforms. The public education system introduced on the Korean peninsula was discriminatory and served Japanese imperialistic goals. Opportunities for upward social mobility were accessible only to a small minority based on their Japanese skills and ideological alignment with the Imperial

values for the colonized.

The land reform and land ownership systems implemented by the Japanese contributed to the formation of a capitalist class of landlords while marginalizing the livelihoods of ordinary people even more. Tenancy rates and rent increased drastically during the colonial period, thus fueling deep-rooted resentment toward the rich.

The dual opportunity of upward socioeconomic mobility, one based on capital and the other on the extent of collaboration with the Colonial administration—Korean civil servants and agents of the Japanese Empire—not only deepened the socioeconomic gap of the traditional Korean society inherited from the Joseon period but also greatly contributed to creating new fissures. The legacy of this social and economic segregation profoundly impacted political and social transformation processes after the liberation of the Korean peninsula.

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GEORGIAN POLITICAL PARTIES (IN) CHASING DEMOCRACY

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Abstract

The present paper investigates different types of intra-party democracy (candidate selection, direct participation, and deliberative). The goal of the theoretical discussion is to apply it in the scholarship conducted to research the Georgian parties' intra-structural development and their transformation while facing everyday politico-economic challenges on the way to democracy. The main argument of the research is grounded on the following observation: endless complications and slow process of introduction of democratic practices in the state's formal institutions has to be linked with nondemocratic traditions inside the party. The work depicts in detail the renovations introduced by the Georgian parties to make their structure stronger and durable. At the same time, party leaders initiate new strategies (DP or DM or both) to empower mid-rank, grassroots members to attract more citizens for deliberation, forming preferences acceptable to many, making the party popular, and succeed in the elections.

Keywords: *Intra-Party democratic models, transitional democracy, party structure, intra-party politics, Georgian political parties.*

Introduction

A political party is a living organism. It reshapes, changes, reacts to social challenges. The structure of the party is essential as it has to be flexible to enact party politics and satisfy the preferences of its members and followers. The institutional arrangement of the state (federal/unitary, presidential/parliamentary, bicameral/unicameral) defines intra-party (IP) politics (Boucek 2002). By all means, the type of electoral system is decisive. As the experience of the states with strong consolidated democracy shows Single Member Plurality (SMP) voting system forms the legislative body with a small number of the parties and creates a single-party government

with strong partisan politics, thus making the decision-making process fast and effective) (Duveger 1964).

Compared to the SMP system which coalesces the party, proportional electoral system (PS) fragments it, encourages faction creation process within the party, promotes the formation of coalitions in the legislative body and government. Lowering the threshold for the party entrance in the parliament forms a favorable environment for the small parties to participate in the elections; at the same time, it encourages the factions inside the party, especially in the big parties to split out. Despite observed benefits of SMP the post-communist states had chosen to establish a mixed electoral system – (SMP + PS) (Boucek 2009). Georgia (post-communist, post-soviet new sovereign state) is not an exception from this pattern. The country has also introduced a mixed electoral system nearly 30 years ago. Although the event of 20th of June 2019 became a breakthrough that triggered imperativeness of changing the established mixed system. To subside the protests in the streets the Georgian authority suggested the replacement of the existed electoral system by a proportional electoral system. However, the promise later was altered. Finally, the government and oppositional parties agreed to the new type of mixed system (20% majoritarian and 80% proportionally elected parliament).

Intra-Party Democracy Models

As I mentioned above, the electoral system determines the institutional structure of the party. The major function of a party is to serve as a channel that connects the citizens to the government and vice versa. Thus, the party has to establish Intra-Party Democracy (IPD) as a mechanism to form and maintain the link between constituents and authority (Sartori 1976).

There are two well-known models of IPD: first is focused on candidate selection (Candidate Selection Model) and the second on direct participation (Direct Participation Model). The first model stands on the procedure to select candidates for the party list. The process of selection is inclusive and competitive. The problem with this model is related to the willingness of the active party members to be involved not only in the selection of candidates but in policy-making processes.

The second model of IPD is the direct participation model (DPM). In this model, the party member

can take part in decision-making processes which include both: policy-making and candidate selection. DPM became quite a common type of IPD. It uses ballots (Scarrow 2014) for policy-making and selecting the candidates. Usually, the ballots are prepared by the leadership; the party members are asked for their opinion while reaching the final decision. For candidate selection some parties use "rotation schemes" (e.g., Green Party in Germany (Borz and Janda 2018) to avoid alienations of the Members of Parliament from their grassroots. US parties use the primaries to nominate candidates for party leadership. It strengthens IPD through competition.

Both above-mentioned models create a favorable environment for the party elite to direct the party's functioning the way they assume to be the most successful. At the same time, both models apply a preference-aggregation process (Gary 2007), which means that the votes for the candidates or policies are gathered to calculate the outcome; these types of IP democracies aim to aggregate individual preferences into overarching public choice.

The last model, the deliberative model (DM) requires the process of deliberation. At the first glance, the question rises whether deliberation is collective or one has his conversation with itself exchanging "reasons and arguments in a mental dialogue" (Fearon 1998). To me, personally, the first does not exclude the second and vice versa. Another issue of deliberation is related to its operationalization. Deliberation is a decision-making process "by means of the arguments" (Elster 1998); it has to be conducted for the purpose to find, form a rational point of view on the arguable subject. This opinion-formation process is a starting point of the decision-making process itself (Chapbers 1996), (Chambers, 2003).

Why IPD Is So Important?

Does not matter what features (and they are plenty) we use to define the specifics of the deliberative model, but the main idea of the process is to form the opinion through participation; the wider is the group of the discussants the outcome of deliberation is more overarching. It has to be mentioned that deliberation has to occur inside the party - between the political elite and middle-rank members (mostly involved in the party's mundane routine and policy-making processes); middle-rank members and grassroots members, grassroots members and citizens (several communicative levels of deliberation). The last is very important as it benefits both - party

members and citizens. the members discuss the problematic issues with the voters to form preferences together. These preferences later are conveyed to the middle-rank layer and the deliberation process starts with two bottom layers; the outcome of the discussion is shared with the political elite. Through deliberation, the citizens figure out how important it is to participate in any political event, express their political viewpoints, confidently argue to form the preference acceptable to many, and feel strong in making their individual independent decisions (White and Ypi 2011; Woklkenstain 2018). Any type of fora can be utilized: assemblies, small or wide party meetings, conventions on a national or regional level, public or door-to-door meetings where the party members meet with the constituents and use every opportunity to argumentatively communicate and converse with them.

This is the theoretical prism through which Georgian parties' IPD will be analyzed. The parties under the research are dichotomized in the following way: new (small parties: Girchi (fir cone) (founded in 2015), Strategy Aghmashenebeli (Builder) (founded in 2016), European Georgia (founded in 2017), and Lelo (Try) for Georgia (founded in 2019)) and longstanding (big parties: Labor Party (founded in 1995) now in decline, UNM (founded in 2001) and Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia (GD) (founded in 2012)). The research used a semi-structured interviewing method. The leaders and middle-rank members of these parties and the prominent experts of the field were interviewed.

Briefly, about the path, the political parties in Georgia followed since independence. Unfortunately, sovereign Georgia had no experience of the plural party system in political life. All the parties established in the early 90s of the last century repeated centralized (vertically controlled) party structure which was Soviet legacy. For decades the parties' leadership operated without any participation of the rank-and-file members in any type of partisan events including candidate selection; policy-making was not observed at all even in-between electoral period; the parties only formally chose ideology and even in very rare cases of ideological parties (early period of UNM); Christian-Democrats (showed some attempts to apply deliberative democracy inside the party and with constituents; finally, these democratic practices became the reason of the party's disintegration)), during the pre-election period their ideology used to shift from right to left to broaden the scope of supporters. The parties mainly were leader-centered, thus fragile and after the unsuccessful election, some of them totally disappeared from the political party landscape. The

influence of this defect legacy is still notable. One of the reasons the party elite chooses a leader over the program is associated with the fact that parties are financed by the state. The voters themselves are also the source of the resilience of this tendency – they had preferred to elect a name rather than the program. A strong leader is a precondition of the party's victory. The lack of civic education of citizens is another reason why the party elite makes its own decision without any form of deliberation. The citizens have to learn that the party is a channel that delivers their interests and preferences to the government, thus it is an instrument to influence authority. The functioning electoral system does not support IPD development as well; the parties are not motivated to develop intra-party structures and institutions; the only aim the parties have is to overcome the threshold and be financed by the state. One more factor that hinders the party's internal democratic changes is that business and state are intermingled (majoritarian Members of Parliament came from the private sector, especially, in the regions and they are focused only on their business interests).

According to the experts, the main indicators of IPD which Georgian parties have to demonstrate are to be the following. The party has to have a clearly defined ideology and stick to it during elections and between electoral periods. It has to have a brand that demonstrates the party's image and position on the political party landscape.

Party has to be more program-centered. The leader-oriented party has problems with establishing IP institutions and is prone to split into factions or disappear completely. It is crucial for the party's longevity and success in the elections to establish the formal procedures (i.e., pre-election formal practices - selection of candidates and election of the prominent leaders; between elections - policy-making and its presentation) and follow them. The party budget is to be wisely calculated with a clear distribution of finances for each political event. Simultaneously, it has to be transparent and accessible to any member of the party. A well-defined financial document increases the legitimacy of the budget trustworthiness of the members.

It is most important that the party is closely linked to the electorate, listens to the voters, understands their interests and articulates constituents' preferences with their interpretation, and provides solutions. Inside the party there has to be deliberation, debate, or discussion on the problematic issues; however, for the electorate, the party should demonstrate cohesion and unity.

The party is a dynamic organization and it has to be functional in-between electoral periods

through structures linking the top–political elite and members on the ground. This is a wider horizontal layer - middle-rank with its sectoral departments that elaborate policies and represent them periodically to the elite and grassroots level. The party is to be built in a balanced way - be flexible to respond to urgent challenges and at the same time deliberate on the long-term issues. The top and middle layers have to be in constant communication to share information, decisions, and policies. And they both have to be accountable to the grassroots level and operate on wider platforms to empower the members on the ground for their active communication with the citizens. Say it briefly, the party leadership has to be accountable to the middle rank and grassroots members. Accountability forms trust toward party elite and encourages rank and file member participation in any type of decision-making process.

At the same time, it is important to encourage different leaders inside the party to contest with ideas, opinions, professional attitudes, being involved in the policy-making process thus making it easy for the party members choosing the right candidate. Promotion of inclusiveness of the members and new members in any partisan process is vital. The mechanism of primaries is the most efficient instrument to make the selection process fair and transparent according to Georgian experts' view.

The history of the party (its development and moments of success during the previous elections) is important for the voters. When making a choice they have to be sure that the party will be effective in the legislative body and public offices.

The outcome of lengthy negotiations of the Georgian parties was that the 2024 parliamentary election had to be no-threshold proportional (these days situation is different). This type of electoral system makes consensus difficult to reach, as it encourages small parties to act as veto players in the parliament or government-formation process. It is a threat to the party's unity, especially, if the party is a massive (big) party with active and empowered factions (here I'd like to include the regional branches and their leaders present so evidently in the biggest oppositional party UNM) to split into factions as the electoral system creates a favorable condition for them to enter the legislative body.

Georgian Parties on Their Way to Democratic Development

Now let's discuss Georgian Parties and their IP politics. All the interviewed experts agreed that the party with the most developed IPD is *Girchi***.** It has a strong right ideology and is solid in ideological terms even during elections. The party targets the specific niche of the electorate with increasing numbers (these are mainly young people). The partisan processes are regulated by functional procedures. It operates the strategy to attract new members and supporters by horizontalization of the party; The party has many autonomous leaders. One of the distinguishing features is that the party relies only on private sponsorship. In the last parliamentary pre-election campaign new money wallets and party' digital currency (GeD) were introduced for the candidate selection process. The person (party member) collecting the most amount of GeD was leading the candidate list. Although the results show that only financial criterium is not enough for the selection process; the information on the origin of the accumulated money is not transparent; thus no one knows how some members got the most amount of currency, and correspondingly, the first places in the list. The door of the party is open for any person (member, nonmember) and gets a chance to become a leader. In terms of the IP models discussed above, *Girchi* utilizes all the mentioned models: the party members elected candidates, it uses direct participation, and through horizontalization strategy the party leaders deliberate with grassroots members to form preferences. Although it has to be noted, that now the party is not big (not a mass party), thus horizontalization works successfully. As soon as, members of it increase significantly, the party leadership has to be ready to change the structure of the party and make it balanced with vertical and horizontal components.

Another party with signs of IP democracy is *European Georgia* (EU). The party introduced a sliding list of the candidates - who has the most popularity, he will be elected as a candidate; in the last elections for the selecting candidates, the party used a specific formula based on past success (percentage gained + number of voters + popularity (weight in the district or region). The party had several prominent leaders (past not present). As the election results show, the sliding candidate idea did not work the way the party leadership calculated. Some leaders of the party took responsibility for the failure and left it. Now the party is in process of reconstruction and rebranding. The party before and during the election applied the candidate selection model and direct participation. Any decision-or-policy-making processes were transparent and the leaders

commended remarkable autonomy in the mentioned events. However, the party did not succeed in the past elections.

UNM (*United National Movement*, the biggest oppositional party) shows the example of unity and strength and can sustain a significant number of voters for almost nine years. Several times the party faced the threat of fragmentation. The prominent leaders have been leaving the party at different times. In January 2017 the driving force of UNM's leadership, about 2/3 of the party elite, separated from the party and founded a new party - European Georgia. This and other cataclysms combined with failure in the 2016 parliamentary, 2017 local, 2018 presidential elections forced the party leadership to start thinking of changes. New leaders joined the party, ballot participation was applied to select the candidates for the party's chairman position (Nikanor "Nika" Melia vs Levan Varshalomidze). For the second phase of the Intra-party election, the party leadership decided to utilize an online platform for fair and transparent voting; the teams of both candidates had the same digital device to avoid penetration of the bots and trolls. Even though the factor of Saakashvili (the former leader of UNM) is still influential, the party opened its doors to new leaders; they are involved in decision-making processes, and in most cases, they are autonomous in their decisions. If considering the latest events developed in the party, it could be said, that UNM shows notable signs of IP democracy – primary's system worked for the candidate selection, direct participation was applied to elect the party's chairman and the leaders either from the central or regional offices used different fora for deliberation with the members on the ground and followers.

Strategy Aghmashenebeli is a young, small, leader-centered party with a center-right ideology. The party leadership is oriented on making policies in a different direction (healthcare, education, national security, welfare, etc.) The party puts a lot of effort to present an effective party program. To achieve this goal party elite invites the groups of experts from the different politico-economic and social spheres and brainstorms to identify either local or national challenges and the ways of their resolution. Another direction the party chose to communicate with potential supporters is deliberation expressed in form of giving professional advice to them to overcome the difficulties. In the process, they educate the group of citizens with specific interests (e.g., the car-re-exporters during COVID-19 period); before meeting the group, the leader and mid-rank members discussed how this concrete problem could be handled. Afterward, they met the group several times, listened

to the people, and offered ideas (legal or financial). There used to be examples when the deliberation ended with an idea to establish association and approach the problem collectively. Although, the political experts think that the party needs more leaders, strategies to attract more people, and techniques to make this party appealing to the voters. Wide usage of any type of digital platform or technology promotes deliberation; the party is expert/program, policy-making-oriented.

Lelo for Georgia is a right party with leftist flavor, has many leaders with notable autonomy, though the shadow of the party founders (prominent bankers) has been seen behind them. The voters have a feeling that if not for the personal/financial problems, they would have not founded the party at all. Despite this *Lelo*'s leadership is eager to attract more prominent persons from the different segments of society. The party is open to new people who operate independently without instructions from above. Georgian youth, frustrated by the familiar politicians and parties, perceive *Lelo* as a chance to make a political carrier. The party has the potential to become a significant player in Georgian political life. The party selects candidates for the election (CS model) and works to make policies. Many competitive leaders and their followers are involved in the process directly (DP model). The analysis of the interviews showed that during communication with the citizens party members are prone to aggregate preferences rather than form them (deviation from DM).

Labor Party has been in action almost 30 years; it had ups and downs; is ruled by an immutable leader since foundation. No alteration of the leaders is observed. The party's leadership is mostly concentrated on the local problems and tries to solve the troubles of one concrete village or district or some legal or tax issues (small-scale deliberative process). The candidate selection procedure undergoes just before the elections and only in the regions.

Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia (GD) was founded in 2012 and passed two phases: till 2016 the party worked in a coalition and, afterward, it has been functioning as an independent party. During the first period, the political council was comprised of all the leaders of the coalitional parties. GD was the youngest in the group and worked on the formation of its own party identity. The leader and founder of GD, Bidzina Ivanishvili, was the most influential person in the coalition, though before making him involved in the decision-making process, some sort of discussions used to take place among the leaders, later Ivanishvili made the final decision. Somehow it looked like teamwork. After 2016 GD, as a part of its own, won the majority of seats

in the parliament. According to the interviews with former GD members (left party in 2019), the organization of the party had become strongly centralized. Decisions were more instructions sent from the first formal and then informal leader and the council just announced them. The party does not have any IP structure, it activates before the election after which only parliamentarians in the committees work during the sessions; no links exist between party leaders and members. The Policy-making routine is not observed well. The Party is strongly verticalized, centralized around one informal leader; other party leaders are not independent players. Correspondingly, none of the above-mentioned theoretical models apply to GD.

And the last point, all the parties have to form an institution that links parliamentarians and the incumbents to the parties, thus making them accountable to the party members of all levels. At the same time, they need to maintain a high degree of independence in policy or decision-making processes.

To summarize, after 30 years from independence the state is still in the transitional period. Some features of IPD of Georgian parties are observed due to the exogenous (EU projects, Association agreement, EU involvement in resolving political crisis) and endogenous (oligarchy, recent events - last elections, a boycott of oppositional parties, lost elections) factors. These positive or negative events have a remarkable impact on the Georgian parties' IPD development. The citizens have to learn that the party is a channel that delivers their interests and preferences to the government, it is an effective instrument to influence authority. The parties' closeness to the constituents empowers members on the ground and enlightens the voters; at the same time deliberation between the political elite, middle-rank and grassroots promote party cohesion and unity - a prerequisite of success in the election. Building intra-party democracy is very essential as it speeds up the prolonged democratic transition. Politicians with strong intra-party cultures and habits behave the same way in governmental offices and legislative bodies. Well-developed IPD transforms parties and their members from the inside and both types of authority stimulate the progression of the state's formal institutions.

Acknowledgment

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SOCIAL DISCOURSE IN THE AFTERMATH OF COLONIALISM: TRAUMA, MEMORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

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Abstract

For societies that have been subjects to colonial rule, coming to terms with the realities of the past is a challenging and painful process. Often, the self-preservation mechanisms of the nation-state and the need to move rapidly beyond the troubles of the past, give rise to oversimplified evaluation and categorization of events and people of the colonial times. It is common, not only in Korea, but in postcolonial societies in general to glorify certain historical figures and occurrences that contributed to the liberation of the country and to condemn others who advanced the interests of the colonizers. The overall perception in the society is that there is a clear distinction between people and events of the past that were beneficial for the national interests and those that were detrimental. Mass education, nationalist agendas, political interests and the innate complexity of historiography contribute to solidifying this understanding. In reality, though, the unresolved issues of the past tend to resurface and haunt the society posing uneasy questions and causing disturbance.

Taking as an example the contemporary society of South Korea and the issues related to its Japanese colonial past the current study argues that the trauma of colonialism needs to be dealt with in a systematic way. Coming to terms with the pain and constructing memory that allows the society to advance freely forward is a process that requires careful look into the realities of the past, acknowledging the need for different standards of evaluation and allowing ambiguity in judgement.

The main examples, used as case studies in this analysis are those of the research paper by J. Mark Ramseyer on the Korean comfort women, that recently caused an international uproar, and the contradictions surrounding the life and work of Yi Gwangsu, a famous Korean author and social activist from the first half of the 20th century.

Keywords: *colonialism, postcolonialism, memory, trauma, Korea*

Nations that have been under the colonial rule of a foreign power have a straightforward story that explains the conditions under colonialism, the liberation and the process of building/recovery of the nation-state. There is a clear-cut line between events and people who contributed to the national cause and those that presented obstacles to achieving the independence of the country.

In reality, though, there is a significant gap between the actual events of the past and the contemporary accounts. The stories of the past are told differently not only within the opposing nations, but even within the same nation. As a result, conflicts arise and the past not only "comes to haunt the present" but the past becomes part of the present, determining relations and events in the contemporary society.

The current study examines the reasons and the consequences of existing diverging discourses of the colonial past and argues for the necessity of taking into account the issue of agency (ability and freedom to act out of one's free will) of the colonial subject and of establishing a higher threshold of tolerance towards ambiguity.

The two case studies presented here illustrate continuing divergent discourses on accounts of the past. The first case shows the ongoing struggle of the colonizer and the colonized for gaining a dominant authoritative historical evaluation on events of the colonial past. The second one concerns the contradicting interpretations of the life and the actions of a prominent figure of a colonized country.

1. Case studies

Grappling with the results of colonialism is a long and painful process which requires revisiting history, re-evaluating events, choices, historical figures and coming to terms with the reality of the past. Although nation building and creation of strong national identity require clear-cut definitions of what is good and what is bad for the nation, it is not always possible to characterize events and personalities in absolute terms. Even if such efforts are made, sometimes, they get challenged from within or without the nation. To illustrate the contradictions of evaluation, the opposing discourses and the constant recall of certain issues of the colonial past, I have taken the examples of the recent uproar with the article of John Ramseyer "Contracting for

Sex in the Pacific War" and the life of Yi Gwangsu, a prominent Korean figure from the beginning of the 20th century.

1.1. The issue of "comfort women" and John Mark Ramseyer's article "Contracting for sex in the Pacific War"

The consequences of the colonization of Korea by Japan are multiple and as any nation dealing with the aftermath of colonialism, Korea continues to this day to discover new dimensions of the damage of the colonial rule and to makes constant efforts to come to terms with them.

The issue of "comfort women", a euphemistic term for sex slaves, is a particularly painful one in Korean history. Along with other Asian countries, Korea for decades has been calling on Japan to offer apology and to compensate the surviving women who were sexually exploited during the Japanese military offensive in Asia. It took a long time for the issue to be admitted and for some of the women to gain the courage to tell their stories, as the shame and the fear of social stigma are not to be neglected in a country where the Confucian views on a woman's chastity and virtues are still strong, and in many ways are defining of how a woman is seen by society. Once surviving women, already of an advanced age, started coming forward with their testimonies, there was a public outcry for justice, government institutions and non-government called for apology of Japan and compensations for the victims. Testimonies and the extensive research on the topic show that many women were kidnapped and forced into prostitution by the Japanese army (Hicks 1997), (Tanaka 2002), (Kimura 2016), (Norma 2016), (Hata 2018), (Nishino, Kim and Onozawa 2018). The issue has been one of the main points of disagreement between Korea and Japan, a reason for long periods of strained relations, spilling over to the areas of politics, economy, trade, culture, etc. Japan continued denying the matter until 1994 when a fund for compensation was set up for the victims. The Japanese prime minister offered an official apology. The compensation that the fund provided came from private donors, not from the Japanese state. This detail, the size of the compensation, the wording of the apology, the appearance of new facts about the horrid realities of the sexual exploitation and, not least, political agendas led to demands for apology and compensation from subsequent Japanese administrations. In 2007, the prime minister Shinzo Abe stated that there is no evidence of forced prostitution inflicted by Japan. A few weeks later, the Japanese parliament offered an apology for the sexual exploitation of women during World War

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Different circles in Japan, including political, over time, have taken a stance to deny the issue, to sway public opinion and to establish a dominant historiography in support of the thesis that forced sexual labour by the Japanese army during the Second World War never existed. An effort in that direction was the 2014 demand of the Japanese government to erase a few paragraphs on the "comfort women" from the textbooks of the McGraw Hill publishing house. Due to the stance taken by American scholars the request was not granted (Fitfield 2015). Another such attempt is the article "Contracting for sex in the Pacific War" by John Mark Ramseyer (2021), a Mitsubishi Professor of Japanese Legal Studies at Harvard University. The article argues that women who provided sex services to the Japanese army during its invasion of large parts of Asia during World War II, entered into voluntary contractual relations with the brothel owners, whom the author calls "entrepreneurs", with the purpose of earning financial rewards that were bigger in comparison with the pay that other jobs offered. According to Ramseyer, the issue was purely a matter of contractual relations that both parties established motivated by mutual benefits.

The article was met with public outcry and protests by scholars, students, organisations and government around the world. It is currently being reviewed again with the purpose of finding out if the arguments it makes are faulty.

Letters of protest and criticism have been signed by more than 2000 scholars, including two Nobel laureates (Kim 2021), criticising the "distortion, misrepresentation, misdirection and omission of historical sources" (Kang 2021).

1.2. The contradictions in the life and work of Yi Gwangsu

Yi Gwangsu is one of the most celebrated Korean authors of the beginning of the 20th century. He is considered the father of modern Korean literature, having contributed largely to introduction of modern literary genres and form, as well as to setting the standard for modern literary language. He is the author of numerous novels, short stories, poems, editorials, essays and travelogues, yet he did not consider himself a literary figure. He regarded himself an educator. To him literature was a means to educate the readers on how to better themselves in order to become citizens of a prosperous nation. All his writing, in one way or another, reflects his goal of

contributing to building a nation that can stand equal to Japan and the other developed countries of the time. For most of his life he stood as a fervent proponent of Korea's independence from Japan. He participated in writing the Declaration of Independence for the March 1st 1919 movement against the Japanese occupiers, translated it into English and made sure it reached foreign diplomats and media abroad. He also participated as a minister of culture in the Korean interim government in Shanghai. Around 1938, Yi Gwangsu's views changed and he became an advocate of the Japanese "Korea and Japan are one body" ideology. According to this propaganda, Korean and Japan share a common ancient past, different from that of China, and are therefore meant to unite and form a one great nation under the Japanese emperor (Yi 1941). Yi Gwangsu adopted a Japanese name, defending this act with the argument that Korean names are actually Chinese in origin and in the distant past they must have been closer to Japanese names (Han 2005). He promoted the idea that there is no other way but for Koreans to become Japanese, not just superficially, but in their core and their blood (Yi 1940). He actively encouraged Korean young people to conscribe in the imperial army to help Japan in its conquering of Asia. He theorized that if Koreans shed their blood for the emperor, Japan will accept them as citizens of the empire equal to Japanese. He envisioned further steps for Koreans, who, once having fully integrated themselves into the Japanese empire, could rise to high positions in Japanese society, control the destiny of the whole empire and thus achieve the goal of Korea rising from the position of a weaker undeveloped nation.

Around the same period, Yi Gwangsu converted from Christianity to Buddhism. In this context he started understanding all living things as equally important beings, who exist on earth for a time that is like a split of a second in the grand scope of the universe, only to die and to transform (get reincarnated) into another being (Hong 2011, 72). Thus, the issues of national identity, politics, etc. were miniscule compared to the greater processes of life and the universe.

2. Memory and power

In ancient Greece, the historian Thucydides "thematized the contradiction between actual history and what is spoken before, during and after historical events, a contradiction that emerges again and again." (Koselleck 2018: 143)

"The discrepancy between past reality and its linguistic processing will never be closed" (Koselleck 2018:157). The reasons for the gap between a historical event and historical account are the objective impossibility to account for all the aspects and details of an event due inherent epistemological limitations and the nature of memory. "When thinking about memory, we must start with forgetting. The dynamics of individual memory consists in a perpetual interaction between remembering and forgetting" (Assman 2008, 97). Because of its instability and unreliableness, memory is susceptible to manipulation. This is even more true for social memory, which depends on the facts being perpetuated in the public domain. The choice of facts to be emphasized and repeated in a society is a prerogative of academia (historians), politicians, intellectuals, journalists, various institutions and organizations. The memory of a society determines the way its members think of themselves, that is their identity. Therefore, the agents determining what stays in the public memory ultimately have the power to control the members of the society. The perpetuation of facts and ideas is realized through the public discourse.

Discourse -> Memory -> Identity -> Power

Power created through the maintenance of certain discourse can be used for the public good, for the interests of certain groups and various agendas, existing within a society – political, ideological, nationalistic, etc, or for purposes outside the nation. Often there are competing discourses that strive to gain prevalence in the minds of people to create group/social memory which can lead to the advancement of a particular agenda. Therefore, social discourse has a great significance for the direction in which a society develops.

According to the same principle, the nature of discourse on colonialism in a postcolonial society determines the way the society copes with the consequences of colonialism, namely the damage on the nation, the trauma of the colonial experience and the ability to recover from the past afflictions. What sets apart colonialism from other historical events and periods in the issues of power and agency, the ability to act and to produce particular effects with one's actions. Often discourses of colonialism fail to take into account the limitations of choice and action of the colonized.

Discourse on Colonialism (power relations between colonizers and colonialized, issues of agency) -> Memory (trauma) -> Identity -> Power

When discussing issues and events pertaining to the time of colonialism, it is necessary to take into account the power relations between the colonizers and the colonized, as well as to consider the possibility of experiences of trauma.

3. Post(colonial) discourse, memory and trauma

The article of John Ramseyer on the sex workers during the Pacific war is an example of an attempt to change the discourse on painful events of the time of the Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula. It constitutes discourse on colonialism. Ramseyer uses as his main theoretical base game theory, which he mentions vaguely stating that the contractual dynamics between the "comfort women" and the brothels are "so basic to elementary game theory" (Ramseyer 2021). Game theory concerns processes within the field of economics. To Ramseyer the issue is purely economic and legal. He provides lavish explanations of the mutual benefits of the "entrepreneurs", that is the brothel owners, and the women. Two Nobel Economics Prize winners, Paul R. Milgrom and Robert B. Wilson, have come forward criticizing Ramseyer's methodology, stating "The appeal Professor Ramseyer makes to game theory provides no support for his claims" and "The soundness of a historical account should be judged based on a review of the evidence, which can never be overruled by some simple game theory model" (Kim 2021). The problem with his methodology lies in the fact that he analyses serious issues of colonialism without taking into account the historical environment, the condition of the women, the power relations between them and the occupiers, as well as the trauma inflicted on them by the aggressors. Simply, John Ramseyer analyses issues of colonialism and trauma without considering neither the colonial reality of the time, nor the trauma that the women sustained and with which they are still dealing today. Setting up the discourse on a different foundation, he is trying to change the memory of the past events, and in this case, he is striving to empower the past colonizer, while at the same time he is inflicting secondary damage on the victims.

One of the main characteristics of the colonial discourse is that it silences the colonized subjects. Their voices are non-existent and the colonizer speaks for them and about them, creating ideas, images and stereotypes that serve his interests. In his article, Ramseyer, completely disregards the abundant accounts of women from many Asian countries who testify to the forceful sexual exploitation of the "comfort women".

In the colonial system the life of the colonized people is dependent on the colonizers. The colonizers have the power to exert complete control over the existence of their subjects. It can be argued that a contract between a colonizer and a colonized subject can never be an agreement between two equal parties exerting their free will and defending their interests. Ramseyer also neglects the fact that at the beginning of the 20th century women were in a very weak position in Asian societies, that were strongly patriarchal. Peterson and Rutherford have termed the position of women in colonized patriarchal society "double colonization" (Peterson and Rutherford 1986). According to Ramseyer's paper a young girl, completely dependent on the male members of her family, most likely illiterate, can enter into a fair contractual relation with a colonizer, making sure that her interests are protected by the contract. Ramseyer does not show in any way the contracts that he describes, neither it becomes clear wat his sources are. If there are such contracts, that only proves that there might have been women who provided services for the Japanese army out of their own will and interest, but it does not discredit the hundreds of testimonies and the evidence that many of the girls were enslaved forcefully. Ramseyer himself, in his paper, calls the exploiter of a woman "her owner". Later he corrected that wording as a "mistake". On the other hand, he completely disregards the trauma that the women endured, speaking of them as ordinary workers. One of the reasons Korea is particularly sensitive when it comes to this problem is the fact the trauma sustained by the "comfort women" has become a national trauma and has turned into a symbol of the way Japan exploited Korea. According to trauma theory, individual trauma is overcome over time through safe environment, repeated positive experiences and healing relationships (Herman 1997). The same can be applied to international relations. In the case of Germany and the Holocaust, Germany has been owning to its mistakes. The country is constantly taking positive action to support the victims and to build positive relations with the victims in Israel and around the world.

As Ramseyer is a Mitsubushi professor at Harvard, his income is provided by a big Japanese company. It is not unlikely that he serves the interests of his benefactor. Mitsubishi is also one of the companies that was involved in forcing people into labour during the Japanese occupation of Korea and was recently sentenced by a Korean court to pay some of the people who the company had forcefully exploited. The issue caused serious damage to the Korea-Japan relations and continues to be a source of disagreement.

The example of Ramseyer's article shows that issues of colonialism continue to affect countries and people long after the colonialism has officially ended. The main struggle is in the field of discourse, as the dominant discourse is the source of memory and memory determines actions, policies, etc., that is memory is power.

In the case of Yi Gwangsu, the contradictory discourses exist within the same society and stem from the ambivalences of the writer's life. The contribution of Yi Gwangsu to Korean literature and to the national idea of Korea is so significant, that even his national betrayal towards the end of the Japanese occupation could not erase his name from the literature and history textbooks. Usually, when Yi Gwangsu is researched, the focus only on the positive or the negative. When he is studied at school as the most significant author of modern Korean literature, his sudden transformation and his failure to uphold the national idea is not talked about or is only vaguely mentioned. There are many scholars and politicians who deny all his achievements, because they consider them stained by his disgrace caused by his cooperation with the Japanese colonizers.

The discourse on his life and his significance for Korean history and culture is diverging. As his life course came to show contradictions, it is normal that the evaluations of his work also exhibit opposing views. Yet, any evaluation by a contemporary person of people and events of the past, particularly the colonial past, should take into account the existing epistemological gap and ask the question if fair and objective evaluation is even possible.

There is a particular period in Yi Gwangsu's life that is rarely, if ever, connected to, or mentioned as a direct reason for the radical change in his ideas and actions. In 1937, the members of the youth organisation *Sooyang Dongwoohoe* [Friendship Association for the Cultivation of Character], which Yo Gwangsu cofounded with his respected mentor Ahn Changho, were arrested for activities against the Japanese authorities. The organization was based on the idea that to build a prosperous nation, Korea needed young people with high moral values and good education. Ahn Changho and Yi Gwangsu worked towards that goal for many years. The Association was officially registered with the Japanese authorities but as they imposed tougher policies of assimilation of the Korean people, the members of the organization started showing signs of resistance. Yi Gwangsu and Ahn Changho were also imprisoned along with their young followers. The members of *Sooyang Dongwoohoe* were tortured severely. Ahn Changho died in prison. Yi Gwangsu was freed after six months on the account of his worsening health. His daughter recalls

that he never completely regained his health after that. There are some speculations that he was freed as he agreed to collaborate with the authorities. In reality, through this incident, Yi Gwangsu lost his mentor, in whom he always found support and inspiration, and had to endure the guilt that the young people whose leader he was, were tortured in prison, and some of them even lost their life. It is very likely that the trauma that he had to endure, and of which his daughter has spoken was so big that made him question whether the nation is more important than the wellbeing of the individual people.

Most of the time it is impossible of to hear directly the words of historical figures. In Yi Gwangsu's case his voluminous writings contain his voice. He is the most researched author in Korea. Perhaps the reason for that is that aside from everything else, his writings provide a glimpse into the agony of an intellectual subjected to the violence and control of colonial power.

4. Conclusion

The effects of colonialism are lasting both for the colonizer and the colonized. Even tough in the contemporary world, it is not accepted to look at nations as former colonizers and former colonies, when issues of the colonization period are raised, they should never be regarded as independent of the power relations that existed between the colonizer and the colonized. In the aftermath of colonialism, there are directed efforts by nations and organizations to achieve certain goals by exploiting the memory of events of colonial times. Memory is created through repeated and persistent public discourse. Analysing competing social discourses can provide insights into the agendas and the power struggles within the national or the international society.

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ELECTIONS IN GEORGIA: LOW TRUST, POOR ACCESS, AND FEAR OF TECHNOLOGIES

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Abstract

Elections in Georgia are characterized by low turnout and a lack of trust. Election results often cause a political crisis, because violations and fraud are obvious and widespread. This paper discusses how voting technologies, especially remote voting, can solve the challenge of turnout by giving those voters who live outside of the country, or in regions far from their voting place, an opportunity to cast their vote via the internet. Lack of political will, rather than technical capacity, seems to be the main obstacle for this change and the open question remains whether a push will come from the bottom-up Approach, the citizens, or the intervention of the international community. In 2024 the country will hold parliamentary and presidential elections according to new standards defined by the constitutional amendments; the introduction of the voting technologies will be most appropriate for these elections.

Keywords: *elections, voting technologies, remote voting, Georgia.*

Introduction

The election code of Georgia was changed several times over the last three decades: the country has experimented with different kinds of electoral systems, but conducting procedures fairly and transparently remains problematic. After the 31 October 2020 parliamentary elections, Georgia plunged into a deep political crisis: oppositional parties refused to accept their mandates and demanded new elections, since, as they insisted, violations have significantly affected the results in favor of the ruling party. This is not the first case in the recent history of Georgia when elections triggered a large-scale political uprising: the "Rose Revolution" in 2003, also was caused by disputed elections.

The 2012 parliamentary elections marked a significant point in the history of the young democracy: the ruling party lost elections and handed over power to a new political authority. Georgia was internationally praised for fair and transparent elections; at that point, prospects were high, the country was expected to have learned why young democracies must be able to conduct fair elections, guaranteeing the legitimacy of the ruling power. However, as the 2020 elections demonstrated, these expectations were futile.

The 2020 parliamentary elections were especially important since it marked eight years in power (two parliamentary terms) of the ruling party the "Georgian Dream". As our recent history shows, two terms is usually the limit Georgian voters give to the ruling parties: the "Rose Revolution" happened 8 years after the adoption of the constitution in 1995 (i.e. beginning of the state-building process in Georgia); in 2012, Saakashvili's party had eight years in power behind their back, and in 2020 Ivanishvilis's ruling party had to undergo a similar test. Unfortunately, these elections again demonstrated significant flaws of elections in Georgia.

As different polls and research show, elections in Georgia are typically characterized by:

1) low voter turnout: usually linked to nihilism, disappointment, lack of political education. For example only 46.7 % of voters participated in the 2018 presidential elections, and 56.1% in the 2020 parliamentary elections (data from the website of the Election Administration of Georgia). In the case of presidential elections, lower turnout is logical: Georgia has a parliamentary system where the President, the head of the state plays a minimal role in running the country. In addition, when one of the candidates is openly supported by the ruling party, other candidates have extremely low chances to succeed; voters don't take this kind of election seriously. In the case of the parliamentary elections though, such a low turnout rate (almost half of the voters) is a disturbing sign for a young democracy. It demonstrates that voters have low trust in state institutions, political actors, and processes.

2) Poor access: approximately one million emigrants, and a significant number of voters living and working far from their hometowns, are unable to travel to the polling stations due to lack of time, or financial resources. According to the National Statistics Office of Georgia, in 2020 the population of the country consisted of 3 000 716 citizens. Unfortunately, Georgia is among countries that experience an outflow of the workforce to countries that offer better work conditions (EU countries, USA, Russia). One million citizens are estimated to have left the country in the last

decades. A significant number of them remain citizens of Georgia and have the right to vote. A vast majority of emigrants are young, or middle-aged people. Internal migration is also widespread, since a) most universities are concentrated in the capital, and b) jobs are available in big cities, while the regions remain economically underdeveloped. Most of these voters, immigrants, who don't reside in the cities, where Georgia has embassies or consulates, as well as internal migrants, residing far from places where they have to vote, are not able to reach the voting stations. Their voices are lost. Or, in the worst scenario, ballots are cast in their name by corrupt members of local election commissions, who are rigging elections.

These two challenges represent just one part of the problem: vote-buying, physical confrontation with journalists on the election day, involvement of the administration resources in favor of the ruling party, which are also still widespread (Human Rights Watch, 2020. OSCE, 2020). Though, in this paper we will address only the low turnout and poor access issues, and how voting technologies can affect these; we hypothesize that voting technologies can make elections more democratic, not only more popular and accessible.

Voting technologies

Technologies have become part of our lives in almost all areas and especially the young, cannot imagine their lives without computers, smartphones, and the internet. No surprise, that concepts like *e-democracy* or *e-governance* have reached even developing countries, where the state struggles with providing citizens with basic services. The COVID-19 pandemic, which locked up most of the world population in their homes, gave an additional impetus to a discussion on a wider application of technologies in political decisionmaking. Elections, as well as some forms of direct democracy, such as referenda, come first to the mind.

While there is a big variety of voting technologies today, some of them date back to the nineteenth century. "The use of mechanics in the area of voting was introduced **as early as the 1890s** with the invention of the Herman Hollerith punch card machinery for the US census, and later developed into electronic voting." (Stenbro, 2010).

A special, even revolutionary change in this field was expected from the end of the twentieth century when personal computers and the internet had completely changed the way of doing business and politics. The predictions were far-reaching: "one can envisage a better… political

process in the future. Access to information will be plentiful and cheap for all citizens. **Political participation, including voting, can be made easier**. The low costs of contact and contract will reduce the costs of participation." (Nye, 2002).

E-voting seems to offer a variety of benefits for all states, strong democracies, or weak, young democracies, that are struggling with the institution-building process: making elections more transparent, speed up the calculation of results, making the process accessible for voters with disabilities, saving money. "The motivation to start with e-voting, therefore, seems **mainly financial, aiming at reducing costs.** This suggests that in the future e-voting will replace traditional ways of voting, and therefore the digital divide can be expected to influence the participation in and the outcome of ballots." (Oostveen, Van den Besselaar, 2004).

In Georgia, elections are conducted in the old, traditional. paper-based form: voters receive the ballots from the local election commission, mark their choice with a pen, and cast the ballot, placed in an envelope, into the ballot box. This is considered to be the safest way of conducting elections, even though we have many times witnessed that there are hundreds of ways to falsify results when the ballot boxes are opened at the end of the day. In this county, they still remember Stalin's words: "it is not important who casts the ballot, it is important who counts them".

In addition, some absurd conspiracy theories emerge time after time, that demonstrates how deeply voters distrust the existing system: before the 2012 parliamentary elections, voters were seriously concerned that the government had purchased pens with special ink, that disappears from the paper after several hours; ballots marked with these pens, would be empty when the ballot boxes were opened and that election commission members would mark them in favor of the candidates of the ruling party.

Voting technologies are usually classified into several forms:

1. Paper-Based Electronic Voting Systems:

- Punch Card Systems;

- Optical Scan Systems.

Advanced forms of a paper-based system like this, will not dramatically change the turnout or access issues in Georgia. Though, it might make the calculation faster and create more

transparency. For some time, it may also attract more young people, or those interested in election technologies, but at the same time, technologies also scare off some people and a dramatic change in turnout is therefore not to be expected.

2. Systems to Electronically Cast Ballots:

- Direct-Recording Electronic Voting Systems;

- Public Network DRE Voting Systems.

Using voting systems that allow casting your vote using touch-screen machines, or pulling down an according lever on the machine, that quickly sends and stores information would be a huge step forward in the direction of making elections modern, and more transparent. The introduction of these technologies can be a sign that the country is making an effort to reach high standards in election administration.

- Remote Voting, or Voting over the Internet (*kiosk* voting, poll site voting).

Internet voting is a form of participation in elections addressing two main issues we put forward in this paper- low turnout and poor access. These forms of remote voting allow voters who cannot travel to the station on the election day, cast their vote from home, or any other place by accessing an according website after the system verifies their identity. ID cards and so-called "card-readers" (cheap and easy to purchase) are necessary. Estonia has made world headlines with the introduction of internet elections and despite a lot of criticisms from skeptics, a significant number of Estonian voters (up to 30 %) prefer to use internet voting (Soudriette, 2016). Estonian experts have traveled to Georgia many times over the period of the last decade to help local colleagues prepare Georgian internet elections. Since 2011, most the Georgian citizens already possess ID cards allowing access online services.

The challenges and benefits of technology-based elections are discussed in detail in different guidelines and handbooks for election observers who travel worldwide to observe elections. A long list of typical advantages and disadvantages is based on the experience of countries that have started experimenting with voting technologies at early stages (IDEA, 2011). For countries like Georgia, that are making the first steps, sharing this experience is valuable to avoid serious mistakes. Some of these pros and cons (Stenbro, 2010), that can be relevant to Georgia, include:

Challenges

Voter education and guidance:

- the need to conduct widespread voter education, its application, and impact on the process: while the country doesn't have a significant number of illiterate citizens like other developing countries, where illiteracy hindered implementation of technology-based elections, Georgia will need to conduct a wide educational campaign aimed at popularization of the reform and instruct voters about details;

Human resources management:

- recruitment of staff with specialized IT skills: training and preparation of the staff is an essential, decisive step. To minimize threats from mistakes or corruption of the involved persons, recruitment should be strict and transparent.

Financial investment:

- cost of introducing and maintaining the technology over the lifecycle of the equipment: in the long run, technology-based elections have to be cheaper (less paper needed, fewer personnel to be hired); though, on the first stage, the state will have to allocate sufficient financial resources to purchase and adjust necessary equipment;

Threats of technical nature;

- security of the voting and counting process;

- potentially losing control over the process to outside technology vendors;

- consequences in the event of equipment or system malfunction.

To avoid mistakes and malfunction of technical nature, the expertise of those countries that have gathered enough experience has to apply. In the case of Georgia, Estonia is the best partner: relations are already established, Estonia has already shared knowledge on many occasions and the willingness to do so in the future, is often confirmed.

Benefits

- eliminating the cost and logistics involved with paper ballots: one of the main benefits, widely discussed in the literature, making technologies attractive to developed, as well as developing countries;

- Improved voter identification mechanisms: fraud with IDs, the same person voting at several stations, and other violations, widespread in elections in Georgia, can significantly decrease if internet voting is applied;

- improved accessibility to voting: this is one of the benefits that make technology-based voting attractive to Georgia. Social groups, that are not able to vote because of disability, long distance to travel from their place of residence, or other reasons (students, voters employed in the capital, immigrants), will have an opportunity to make their voice heard again;

- easy conduct of complex elections: election management will be made easier with technologies and make the work of the election commissions faster and more efficient;

- increase in voter turnout: higher turnout can improve the overall political landscape in the country, increase trust in the political process, make the results of the elections appear more legitimate.

- faster, more accurate, and standardized counting of ballots: currently, preliminary results of the elections are usually known only on the second day; official results take several weeks to be announced. At the same time, in modern times, voters and first of all political parties want to know the results much earlier. "Exit polls" are conducted therefore by several companies and when their results are not close and show significant differences, the country finds itself in an absurd situation: opposing parties celebrate their victories based on those "exit poll" results that are in their favor, while the voters wait for the official results.

- prevention of certain forms of fraud - "vote-buying" by paying a certain amount of money is a common practice and since a significant part of the population is poor, those parties who can afford it, benefit a lot from the voter's poverty. Another unpleasant practice is forcing civil servants and their families to vote for the ruling party; though, these cases are extremely hard to prove, because nobody will admit unless a brave civil servant decides to become a whistleblower. Internet voting can put an end to forcing people to vote for a specific political force because when voting online, the voter can change his/her decision during certain period of time (this can even be a period of several days).

Politicians usually propose amendments to the election code, that can make their way to power easier; few proposals are made to make participation easier for voters. The application of voting technologies (electronic voting, internet voting) is usually strongly opposed by the ruling elites and bureaucracy. In discussions, the threat of elections being "stolen" ("hacked by enemies"), or other drawbacks of voting technologies are often taken to the extremes, and negative examples of some foreign countries proved that technologies can ruin Georgian elections.

On the other hand, there is evidence and experience of countries, where voting technologies have contributed to solving problems typical for Georgian elections (Goldsmith, Ruthrauf, 2013). Lack of political will seems to be the main factor in the current cul-de-sac. Changing attitude toward voting technologies can offer a solution. The question is if the impetus will come from the grassroots, international partners, or the local political elites on their own.

Prospects of remote voting in Georgia

The issue of introducing voting technologies in Georgia has a rather peculiar fate: on the one hand, government members often announce that Georgia is ready for this change and even promise to launch some technological changes in the nearest future, on the other hand, almost nothing is changing, or the pace is extremely slow. Furthermore, recent elections in Georgia (2018, 2020) left an impression that things are getting only worse and start to resemble the elections in the 1990s.

In 2015 the Minister of Justice announced that technically, Georgia is ready for electronic

elections.[2] She stressed, that this form of election will allow voters residing abroad, participate. Some legislative amendments would be necessary to be able to launch the project, she added. This statement was made at a public event in the frames of an international project with the EU. The same minister made similar statements in 2016.[3]

In January 2021, the executive director of the ruling party and former head of the parliament, announced that at the elections of local self-government in autumn 2012, it is planned to introduce voting technologies and apply equipment that will identify voters by their fingerprints.[4] "This will end the problem of unbalanced protocols, that we witness for the last 30 years in this country" - he specified. He asked the Election Administration of Georgia to start necessary procedures to purchase equipment, while the parliament will take care of according legislative amendments. This statement was made during the political crises when all opposition parties refused to take their mandates in the newly elected parliament because they claimed elections were fraudulent.

The Election Administration of Georgia, for its part, boasts to have launched a pilot project in 2019 Sakrebulo by-elections at several precincts. "By implementing the mentioned initiative, the EA (Election Administration) aims at discussing the possibilities of gradually integrating modern and successful electoral technologies in electoral processes in Georgia".[5] Previously, plans for introducing technologies in forthcoming elections were presented by the Elections Administration to local NGOs.[6] The project was implemented by the financial support of the Government of Canada and in cooperation with the Delian Project (https://www.delianproject.org/), a non-profit organization based in Canada that aims at supporting emerging democracies, with a particular focus on physically disabled and special needs voters.

An important detail: according to official data, the number of clients who have access to a fixed internet connection via optical cable in 2020 was 998 thousand. In the last 4-5 years Georgia had a better speed of optical cable-based internet penetration than many European countries.[7] This

[2] https://www.ambebi.ge/article/146649-ra-aris-elektronuli-archevnebi-romlistvisac-sakartvelo-ukve-mzad-aris-aucilebeli-inpormacia-amomrchevlebistvis/. Retrieved 18/04/2021.

[3] https://www.ghn.ge/news/163809. Retrieved 18/04/2021.

[4] https://knews.ge/?p=57316. Retrieved 18/04/2021.

[5] https://cesko.ge/eng/list/show/117962-khmis-eleqtronuli-datvlis-sapilote-proeqti-. Retrieved 18/04/2021.

[6] https://cesko.ge/eng/list/show/113719-arasamtavrobo-seqtoris-tsarmomadgenlebi-eleqtronuli-khmis-datvlis-sapilote-proeqts-gaetsnen. Retrieved 18/04/2021.

[7]https://netgazeti.ge/news/526948/?fbclid=IwAR01mt6weyAY1DeDvrsKHAIy5ghVw_hyqT17ULwWE0aa

means that a significant number of Georgian households have access to fast internet, an important technical aspect necessary for remote voting.

Recently PMCG research center, a Tbilisi-based international development company, published a policy paper titled "Georgia - Fit for the Age of Artificial Intelligence?". The paper analyzes recent developments in the country based on international rankings (Global Innovation Index) and information gathered from local experts and public institutions, concluding the country is experiencing a significant decrease in this field. According to the above-mentioned Global Innovation Index, the country scored zero points regarding a vision in the field of AI since there is no government policy, plan (See Figure 1). This is extremely disappointing since Georgia used to be a regional champion and forerunner in the field of electronic public services. The paper recommends the government starts working on a national AI strategy document and take further steps not to lose time.

The main conclusion of this paper perfectly corresponds with the impression that citizens have about the government policy concerning AI development and in our particular case, voting technologies: promises and talks are not followed by actions. Furthermore, since most of the public promises to implement modern forms of voting are made in the presence, or in the frames of projects financed by foreign partners, the impression is that the audience for these talks is foreign partners, and most importantly, changes will occur only in case there will be pressure on the local elites from the outside.

An additional unpleasant issue that makes skeptics assume, that remote voting will not be implemented in Georgia soon and technological upgrade of the election process will be purely cosmetic, is of political nature: former President of Georgia Saakashvili announced, that he supports internet elections and sees it as the best way to give emigrants a chance to vote. Since the current ruling party is in bitter antagonism with the former President and promises to send him to prison if he steps a foot in Georgia, the issue has become overly politicized and it is most improbable that the ruling party will support the idea of internet elections.

Nevertheless, if pressure from the local civil society increases and the international community supports local initiatives, the government will have to go further, than slow and cosmetic changes. Otherwise, the 2021 post-election political crisis is just a first sign of future political turbulences

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XoIMcb3MjRj_sRc Retrieved 18/04/2021

Georgia will face with the current methods of election management.

Figure 1: AI Readiness Index of Georgia

Conclusion

30 years after gaining independence, elections in Georgia are still characterized by violations, fraud, and low turnout. The election code has been amended many times, each new government trying to tailor it according to its own taste. All these years, elections are paper-based and voting technologies are not used for reasons that are quite clear. At the same time, representatives of the ruling party promise to introduce voting technologies in the nearest future. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of emigrants and people residing far from cities where they have to vote, cannot

participate in elections.

The challenge of low turnout and poor access can be solved by introducing remote voting. Technically the country is prepared for this innovation, as local officials claim. Lack of political will seems to be a problem. After the 2020 parliamentary elections, the country has experienced one of the most serious political crisis of the last decade. Poor management of elections has become obvious. A need for fundamental, not cosmetic changes is undeniable. Voting technologies carry the potential of making elections more transparent and fair, with an emphasis on voters whose voices have been lost and neglected for years.

These are three actors who can initiate a substantial reform of the election system in this regard: the local political elite, the international actors/donors, and Georgian citizens. The local elites will not want, or be able to change the current practices: the ruling party benefits from the current way of election management; the opposition parties are too weak, though there is a potential and even declared readiness among some of them to support the modernization of voting techniques. If these parties manage to mobilize their supporters, the question may become part of the political agenda. Local NGOs will most probably support similar initiatives since they are most active in describing and criticizing elections in Georgia.

A crucial role has to be played by the international community. Like in many other cases, for example, the reform of the Judicial system, a clear position, support of the foreign partners, mainly the US and EU, can play a decisive role. Of course, voting technologies are not an absolute must and end in itself, but it is obvious that the election process has to undergo a very serious upgrading in Georgia, and without a push from the outside it is less realistic to happen.

Finally, timing is also important. Introducing new forms of voting will require significant time to prepare the infrastructure, staff, and voters. The most realistic time for a full-scale change, like introducing an optional internet voting in the whole country, can be 2024, when the Parliament, as well as the President of Georgia will be elected according to a new system: The Parliament only by the party lists (proportional system), and the President will not be directly elected by the people, but a special institute. It is enough time to make all necessary preparations before that. 2024 will therefore mark a new beginning for the political system of Georgia and it will be appropriate time to introduce changes in the election form and its procedures.

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GEORGIA'S FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONSTITUTIONS

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Abstract

Georgia's hybrid (partly autocratic and partly democratic) political system has been fairly stable for the last twenty-five years. This system may be described through a set of unwritten rules that the author defines as Georgia's unwritten Constitution. This relative stability is juxtaposed with a trend of frequent overhauls of Georgia's written Constitution. Even though the latter mainly conform to basic requirements of democracy, its frequent changes at least in part reflect the discontent of the Georgian public and its political elites with the failure to consolidate the democratic political system. So far these changes, supposed to move Georgia closer to the democratic model, failed to achieve their expected results and have often led to unforeseen consequences.

Keywords: *Georgia, democracy, hybrid regime, informality, constitutionalism*

Key concepts: Constitutionalism and informality in hybrid regimes

The topics of the Constitution and state-building are supposed to be closely interlinked. Admittedly, the Constitution is a foundation of a state; a story of state-building in any country cannot be told without recounting enacting and, if applicable, amending its Constitution.

This linkage, however, presumes the existence of *constitutionalism*, a meta-principle that implies effective supremacy of the constitution over the wills of specific governments and other

political actors. This relates not so much to features and qualities of formal constitutional documents, but rather to political cultures and entrenched political practices.

In countries where robust traditions of constitutionalism are lacking, the presumption that their political systems are based on their (written) constitutions may be questioned. This does not imply that in such cases, constitutions do not matter or are blatantly violated. Their formal provisions are usually followed and have some limiting effect on actions of powers that be. Nevertheless, the real workings of the political system cannot be derived and understood from its written constitution. There is a wide and conspicuous gap between conventional expectations of political science with regards to different constitutional models and actual political practices.

A general theoretical framework that may account for this gap is the concept of "informality" (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Sindzingre, 2006; Ledeneva, 2012). This approach presumes significant distance between formal, written, and transparent rules codified in the Constitution and legislation that regulate power relations within a given polity, and broadly shared and observed informal rules that define how the system "really works". There may be no open clash between formal and informal rules: rather, the latter implies finding ways *around* the former. In such a world, the meaning of the word "formal" refers to something superficial, external, imposed, and not authentic; at the same time, for whatever reasons, it is also recognized that formalities are necessary and should be observed. Conversely, unwritten or informal rules are seen as "organic" and authentic in a sense of being better suited to traditions, values, and mores of a given society.

This allows us to say that the gap between formal and informal rules is based on a deep *normative gap* between value systems on which each of them is based. A clash between ideology and culture may be another way to conceptualize this gap: formal rules relate to a set of aspirational norms defining how it is supposed to be, while informal ones define how things "really are" based on the experience and entrenched practices of a given society. Both sets of norms and rules matter, though actual practices consist of navigating ways between them.

"Hybrid regimes" is another core concept implied here (Diamond 2002). It implies a combination of features of democracy and autocracy within a given political regime that does not allow categorizing it unequivocally either as a democracy or an autocracy, even though some authors present them as sub-species of democracy, such as "defective democracies" (Merkel 2004)

or of autocracy, such as "competitive authoritarianism" (Levitsky and Way, 2010). I argue that presuming a wide gap between formal and informal constitutions is a productive way to describe regime hybridity – at least, this works in the Georgian case. Usually, formal constitutions of hybrid regimes generally satisfy minimal requirements of democracy; it is their entrenched political practices that don't.

Among different conceptualizations of hybrid regimes, I give preference to Thomas Carothers' concept of "gray zone" politics (Carothers 2002). What I find especially useful is his description of "dominant power politics" and "feckless pluralism" as two "syndromes" typical for gray zone regimes. I argue that "dominant power politics" is the prevalent mode of the Georgian political system, though it is also accompanied by expressions of "feckless pluralism"; both syndromes coexist and reinforce each other.

Georgia's constitutional discontent

There is an apparent paradox in the Georgian political development. During its thirty years of independence, Georgia's constitutional system has been continuously contested and frequently overhauled. The changes were supposed to lead to the consolidation of democratic institutions, however, such consolidation was never achieved, even though different versions of the Constitution mostly conformed to recognized democratic norms. On the other hand, the character of Georgia's hybrid political system has been quite stable.

Arguably, it was the perception of a salient contradiction between the recognized normative framework of western-style democracy and the reality of the political system that was at least one of the key trigger incentives for frequent constitutional changes. Both Georgian political elites and the public are united in their proclaimed support for the idea that Georgia should be a democracy. While some, not particularly influential political players attack liberal values, no political or social force of any consequence openly rejects the idea of democracy (Nodia 2020). However, the objective of establishing a western-style liberal democracy in Georgia remains elusive.

Georgia's hybrid political system stabilized around 1995; if we base our assessments on authoritative ratings of organizations like Freedom House, the degree of democratic freedoms has remained roughly the same, oscillating between the scores of 3 and 4, that in the system proposed

by this organization, stands for "partly free", with the score between 1 and 2.5 stands for "free" and between 5.5 and 7 – for "not free".[8] *Democracy Index* of the Economist Intelligence Unit also consistently puts Georgian into the category of "hybrid regimes".[9]

This is another way to say that the Georgian political system keeps muddling through a "gray area" of a hybrid regime. Its power relations may be invariably described as "dominant power politics" implying a ruling political party created around a single powerful political leader[10] controlling all levers of political power, including courts and local government, and wielding considerable influence on the media and business. The democratic element is represented by the competitive opposition, defiant independent media, and fairly vibrant civil society. These are powerful enough to occasionally influence the behavior of government and even occasionally achieve a change of government, without, however, being able to impose true accountability on any incumbent government. This allows applying the term "feckless pluralism" to the democratic element of Georgian politics.

What explains the serial failure to consolidate democratic institutions in Georgia? This is a very broad topic; attempts to broach it might deal with structural factors such as a general level of economic and societal development, features of political culture, legacies of the Soviet rule, geopolitical environment, etc. In this paper, I will not deal with this broader topic; I will only juxtapose the stability of Georgia's hybrid political system with the futility to change it through different formal constitutional arrangements.

Main provisions of Georgia's informal constitution

Trying to codify informal constitutions may be considered a contradiction in terms, but I believe such an attempt may be of value. Some political practices become entrenched enough to create expectations among influential political actors that "this is how things work in this country". Based on my own and other author's research of Georgia's political system (Wheatley, 2005;

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[8] These ratings are available on www.freedomhouse.org.
[9] This organization compiles the yearly *Democracy Index* since 2006 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020).
[10] It is conventional to divide the history of independent Georgia into four periods of personalistic political regimes: those of Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1990-91), Eduard Shevardnadze (1992-2003), Mikheil Saakashvili (2004-2012), and Bidzina Ivanishvili (since 2012).

Nodia 2012; Aprasidze 2016), I will formulate the following provisions of Georgia's "informal constitution":

(1) The ruling party or "team" has a strong (often constitutional) majority in parliament, controls local government, has effective control of the judicial system, wields a strong influence on big business, and a large part of the media. There is no distinct dividing line between the ruling party and the state;

(2) The ruling party is built around the personality of its leader; the electorate does not distinguish between the party and the leader; departure of the leader leads to the demise of the party;

(3) The incumbent power has significant leverage on the electoral process through its influence on electoral administration and a capacity to exert pressure on large segments of voters (such as civil servants); therefore, while the elections are largely free, they are not seen as fair. The opposition has to compete against a significant handicap. Typically, it does not recognize the fairness of the electoral victory of the incumbent party;

(4) In exceptional circumstances, when the popularity of the incumbent government drops very low, the change of government may still occur. It may happen through a "revolution" based on the broad mobilization of street protest, or elections; the public never knows which of the two scenarios is more likely;

(5) There exists political opposition that contests power in elections, is represented in parliament (unless it chooses to boycott it), has an influence on formulating the political agenda, and, at least occasionally, can mobilize sizeable public protest;

(6) Typically, the opposition is represented by a large number of unstable political parties, with the most important of them created around a single powerful leader, or small group of leaders; parties have no distinct agendas and ideologies and mainly compete based on the popularity of their leaders and demonstrative hostility towards the incumbent power;

(7) There exist influential independent media. The government harasses some media outlets and may take over some of them; as a result, it may gain an advantage in the media by controlling TV companies with the greatest outreach. However, there is always fairly influential independent media (including printed and electronic forms)

so that every political opinion is effectively expressed. The media is politically polarized, most important media organizations are presumed to be either on the government or the opposition side.

(8) There exists an independent and vibrant civil society sector that is free to express its opinions. It has some, though the limited influence on political agendas of the government and the opposition. However, civil society organizations depend on western donor assistance and have difficulty mobilizing support beyond a narrow circle of people involved in their activities. The source of its influence largely lies in its link to the international democratic community. [Note: in the last years, this may be changing as some broader organizations that depend on local volunteerism and support have emerged].

(9) The Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) enjoys important privileges as compared to all other religious denominations. It provides symbolic legitimation for the incumbent power, while the government persistently demonstrates its support to the Church. No government can consistently ignore its demands – though it may occasionally disagree on specific points. Other religious organizations are relatively free to function but may face obstacles in their activities.

(10)   The international democratic community or "the West" can occasionally exert significant influence on the decisions of key political actors. While it cannot change the nature of the political system, it can moderate the behavior of both government and the opposition at critical junctures. Local political actors have high, sometimes exaggerated expectations of the western role.

These provisions have been largely valid for the last 25 years. Before that, illegal or semi-legal armed organizations led by warlords did not allow for the consolidation of any kind of political system.

This does not mean that there were no important changes within those 25 years: a qualitative increase in state capacity and good governance since the 2003 *Rose Revolution* is the most important of them (Cheterian, 2008; Nodia 2013); however, when it comes to effective rules of contestation and exercise of political power, no comparable developments have occurred. These "rules" or entrenched practices were always openly contested, at least from the part of the society

that can be considered pro-western or pro-democracy (in Georgia, these are considered synonymous). However, while this contestation has contributed to two changes of power in 2003 and 2012, it did not succeed in changing the underlying informal rules, which continue to define the reality of Georgia's political system.

Georgia's Changing (Formal) Constitutional Environment

Georgia's formal constitutional system has been in constant change, without having yet achieved a point where no further changes are expected or fought for. This creates a parallel history to that of Georgia's political developments. Changes in written constitutions are influenced by political developments and influence them back, but often in ways that were not expected by initiators of constitutional innovations.

There are mostly two sides to constitutional debates: those primarily concerned with government effectiveness (or the "energy in the executive", in Alexander Hamilton's memorable phrase), and, on the other hand, the fear of a too-powerful executive lead by a dominating individual leader. Traditionally, the incumbent party represents the former party and the opposition and the civil society the latter.

Since Georgia's independence, one can discern four main stages of its formal constitutional development.

(1) *1990 and afterward: Amending the Soviet Georgia Constitution.* Since the nationalist Round Table coalition came to power in November 1990, it announced a process of restoration of Georgia's independence; on April 9 of 1991 Georgia, following a referendum, formally proclaimed itself independent. However, it became fully effective and internationally recognized only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 (Gachechiladze, 1995, 38-39). At this point, there were no attempts at drafting a new Constitution; several ad hoc amendments were made to the existing Constitution of Soviet Georgia. However, major issues that have defined Georgia's constitutional debates came to the fore already at this early stage.

The first amendments, enacted immediately after the change of power, were symbolic, like removing the words *soviet* and *socialist* from the text of the Constitution.

The first substantial amendment created the powerful office of president in spring 1991; in May the same year, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the leader of the Round Table, was elected to this position. The opponents assessed this as a move towards strengthening Gamsakhurdia's personal authoritarian rule. The protest against Gamsakhurdia's alleged dictatorship led to a coup that forced him to flee in January 1992. Soon afterward, Eduard Shevardnadze, the former communist leader of Georgia, returned to stabilize the new regime. In effect, this task took a couple of years, as Shevardnadze had to compete for power with warlords who carried out the coup (Jones 2012, 68-85).

As the allegations of Gamsakhurdia's authoritarianism had been linked to the creation of the office of the presidency, the new authorities felt compelled to abolish it. On the other hand, most supporters of the new regime considered Eduard Shevardnadze's leadership to be indispensable for the consolidation of the political system. Hence they wanted extended power for him without calling his position that of a "president"; others were reluctant to allow him too many powers. A compromise solution implied creating the office of the chairman of parliament and the head of state, elected in a direct vote separate from the parliamentary elections. Shevardnadze ran for that office unopposed and got 96 percent of the vote. This result was highly paradoxical: having rejected the office of president to avoid authoritarian leadership, the new system provided for an even greater concentration of power within a single person (Babeck 2013, 10-12). However, until 1995, the presence of still powerful warlords made this concentration largely formal.

The electoral system was another important issue. For the first free elections in 1990, as a result of a compromise between the Communist authorities and the opposition, a mixed system was introduced whereby part of the mandates went to party lists with a relatively high threshold of four percent and the other part – to single-mandate constituencies based on the majoritarian system. The mixed system has been in place including the 2020 parliamentary elections, though the ratio between the proportional and majoritarian components, as well as the size of the threshold, has changed several times.

The electoral system created for 1992 elections was a partial exception; a simple first-past-the-post system was used in single-mandate constituencies, while the proportional part was based on ten multi-mandate districts without any threshold. The result was an extremely fragmented and dysfunctional parliament that corresponded to the

general condition of inefficiency typical for the Georgian state of that period. To some, the high level of parliamentary diversity was a good thing: the absence of a strong majority induced pro-Shevardnadze forces to seek compromise solutions with the opposition. However, its obvious dysfunctionality undermined trust towards the institution of parliament and contributed to the perception that Georgian democratic pluralism is bound to be "feckless". This experience contributed to reintroducing a relatively high threshold for party lists (by 1999, it went up to seven percent) and legitimated a trend to strengthen presidential powers.

(2) *1995: A Quasi-American Compromise*. The new Constitution of independent Georgia was adopted in 1995 after a period of lengthy discussions. At the time, this was widely considered a landmark event: the uncertainty and turmoil of the early 1990s were over and the country was transitioning to some kind of normalcy or a more orderly and stable stage of development. After several years of the collapse of state power an aversion to the word "president" was largely overcome; but the scope of his authority (everybody presumed that Shevardnadze would take that position) was fiercely contested. Shevardnadze's supporters wanted a super-presidential (formally, mixed) system, typical for many post-Soviet countries. However, not having a constitutional majority in Parliament, they had to find a compromise with the opposition that advocated for a weak presidency within a parliamentary system. A compromise solution was found in an American-style formula of relatively strict division between Parliament and the presidency (Babeck 2013).

The way the system worked in reality, however, was far cry from the American model. On the formal constitutional level, the lack of anything smacking of federalism or even local government created the most striking contrast. No less importantly, there emerged a tacit assumption that on the national level, having a split government with Parliament opposed to the president would have disastrous consequences for Georgia and had to be avoided at all costs. Such fear was not fully ungrounded: provided recent experience of political polarization leading to a civil war, there were no guarantees that a split government would work. Presumably, a stable parliamentary majority supporting the president was an absolute must. 1995 and 1999 elections did produce such parliaments;[11]

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[11] Divisions within the ruling party, Citizens' Union of Georgia, between Shevardnadze and Zurab Zhvania, the parliamentary speaker's reformist wing created a modicum of balance; however, until 2002, these internal tensions did

however, the prospect of the opposition victory in 2003 parliamentary elections (with Shevardnadze's term in office to continue until 2005) was seen as a harbinger of a major crisis. The government tried to prevent this by blatantly rigging the election results, which, in its turn, led to wide protests later called the "Rose Revolution", and Shevardnadze's resignation (Fairbanks 2004). This also put an end to the quasi-American constitutional system in Georgia.

(3) *2004: Superpresidentialism for Modernization.* In February 2004, a few months after the November 2003 Rose Revolution, the Constitution underwent another overhaul. A notionally "mixed" system was introduced that was presented as following the French model (as the previous one was following the American one). A prime minister's position was introduced that was dependent on the parliamentary majority but shared control over the executive with the President, who retained direct control of the key ministries such as those of defense, internal affairs, and foreign affairs. In effect, this system was usually described as that of "super-presidentialism" typical for many post-Soviet countries. It was a perfect fit for full domination of a single political leader, this time Mikheil Saakashvili, the leader of the Rose Revolution (Godoladze 2013).

In effect, however, this domination was predicated not so much on the Constitutional premises than on the overwhelming majority of the ruling party, the United National Movement (UNM), in Parliament and, no less importantly, on the commanding authority that Saakashvili had within that party. This Constitutional set-up came to a test following the 2012 parliamentary elections which allowed the oppositional Georgian Dream (GD) party to create a majority in Parliament while Saakashvili had another one year of his presidential term to serve. During the year of cohabitation, despite an extremely polarized political environment, the president's powers became purely symbolic, which contradicted the supposedly "super-presidential" character of the Constitution. The informal constitution that did not recognize any kind of power-sharing prevailed. Saakashvili showed compliance with the latter by voluntarily forsaking his formal constitutional right to directly control the military and the police.

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not lead to an open split.

(4) *2013 and 2017: New Parliamentarism in the Shadow of Informal Governance.* In 2010, the UNM-dominated Parliament undertook another overhaul of the Constitutional system by expanding the powers of the Cabinet and making the prime minister the top official of the country; President's powers were severely limited though he/she was still popularly elected and retained some responsibilities in the realm of foreign and security policies. The change was supposed to come into force (as it did) after Saakashvili's second and last presidential term came to end in the fall of 2013 (Nodia and Aprasidze, 2013). In 2017, the GD-dominated Parliament made another set of amendments including further curtailing presidential powers and abolishing popular direct elections of the president, though it allowed for the last such elections in 2018 (Civil.ge, 2018).

There were speculations that the 2010 changes reflected Saakashvili's wish to move to the prime minister's chair after his last presidential term expired – an assumption that cannot be checked anymore. At the same time, however, the change reflected a widespread view that the parliamentary system would make Georgia's political system more democratic as it would run counter to the personalization of the political power in the presidency and would encourage sharing power within coalition governments.

However, so far the results of the constitutional change have not indicated any move in this direction. On the contrary, the new system allowed for the so-called "informal governance", whereby Bidzina Ivanishvili, the leader of the GD, is widely believed to wield effective control of the government without occupying any official government position.[12]

(5) *Further Constitutional changes?* Pro-democracy groups in Georgia hope that further constitutional changes may still do the trick of making Georgia's political system fully democratic. Introducing a fully proportional electoral system is the source of the greatest hope; in the existing mixed system, the incumbent party tends to carry all or almost all single-mandate constituencies which may allow it to get a comfortable majority in Parliament without clearly winning the party-list component (Nodia 2019). This is effectively achieved: Following the 2017 Constitutional amendments, the 2024

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[12] After GD came to power winning parliamentary elections in October 2012, Ivanishvili only served one year as prime minister; later he retired having announced that he was becoming a private citizen again; in May 2018, he decided to take the position of the chairman of the GD party, retiring again in January 2021.

parliamentary elections are to be held using a fully proportional system. As of the time of this writing, the ruling party and the opposition are negotiating further amendments such as lowering the threshold for party lists to allow as many parties in parliament (Civil.ge 2021b). The expectation is that this will increase the probability of coalition governments. So, far, this did not work either. As an exception, 2020 parliamentary elections took part with a one percent threshold: however, the GD still got a comfortable majority in Parliament. All eight opposition parties that cleared the threshold declared the elections fraudulent and refused to take up their parliamentary mandates (later, two of them changed their mind – Civil.ge, 2021a).

Conclusions: Future Prospects

As this paper is being concluded, Georgia is in the middle of a political crisis. It was triggered by the refusal of the opposition to accept the results of parliamentary elections and take its seats in Parliament. It demands early elections but also further reforms to ensure fairness of the electoral process that may require further constitutional changes.

Despite the high level of political polarization, however, the difference between the parties on the core Constitutional issues has narrowed. There is an apparent consensus around the idea of a parliamentary system of governance, as well as an eventual transfer to a fully proportional electoral system; the debate is only whether snap elections should be held before that, and, if yes, whether it would be held on a fully proportional system. The ruling party also appears inclined to accept lowering the electoral threshold as part of the deal, if such a deal is achieved.

There are other crucial issues, such as the judiciary and the justice system, in general, being perceived to be manipulated by the incumbent governments. The assumption is that if the opposition has a greater role in the appointment of the prosecutor general or the judges, the system will become more independent.

It is possible that eventually, Georgia will come to this point. Nevertheless, there is a risk that a movement to fragmented parliaments and coalition governments will bring the system closer to "feckless pluralism" thus creating renewed nostalgia for the dominant power politics. Alternately, the Georgian political elite may prove successful in creating *both* effective

governments and a more pluralistic political system. However, these are speculations; in this paper, I only tried to analyze the development of Georgia's political system so far.

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SPIRITUAL AND RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT IN KOREA

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Abstract

This paper recounts some examples of religious and spiritual organizations and leading figures who support the Korean independence movement and associate themselves with the struggle for independence and creation of a modern Korean nation-state. The period of Japanese occupation and annexation of the Korean peninsula in the twentieth century is relative short compared to other such periods. Formally, it is 35 years, between 1910 and 1945, although for years before 1910 Japan has tried to influence and control both the internal and the external affairs of Korea. Despite this, the Korean Independence Movement has a lot of interesting and dynamic features; it also has its own specifics and idiosyncrasies compared to other independence movements in Asia and other parts of the world. The Korean people's aspirations to break free from the Japanese Empire are directly related to the situation on the Korean peninsula in the first half of the twentieth century, including the spiritual and religious background of the intensive modernization processes of the Korean nation and culture that take place simultaneously with the independence movement.

The aspects of the independence movement in Korea include the mutual influence of the modernization and the raising of the national consciousness. The roles of different religious and spiritual traditions and new developments contribute to the creation of a unique religious situation. There is renewed interest towards Confucian and Buddhist traditions that have been present in Korea for centuries; there is the pressure of forced "state Shinto" and Japanized versions of religious traditions, including syncretic ones; there is an increasing influence of relatively recently introduced Christian traditions, mainly Catholicism and American Protestant Churches; there are home-grown new religious movements.

With the quick raising of the national consciousness of the people, the domestic traditions as well as the recently introduced traditions from other parts of the world, the religious practice increasingly associates with resistance to Japanese and Japanized traditions, and ultimately – in many cases – associates with the independence movement.

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1. Introduction

The period of Japanese occupation and annexation of the Korean peninsula in the twentieth century is relatively short compared to other such periods elsewhere. Formally, it is 35 years, between 1910 and 1945, although for years before 1910 Japan had tried to influence and control both the internal and the external affairs of Korea.

The Korean Independence Movement during this period has a lot of interesting and dynamic features; it also has its own specifics and idiosyncrasies compared to other independence movements in Asia and other parts of the world.

The Korean people's aspirations to break free from the Japanese Empire are directly related to the situation on the Korean peninsula in the first half of the twentieth century, including the spiritual and religious background of the intensive modernization processes of the Korean nation and culture that take place simultaneously with the independence movement. The aspects of the independence movement in Korea include the mutual influence of the modernization and the raising of the national consciousness. The roles of different religious and spiritual traditions and new developments contribute to the creation of a unique religious situation.

Very often in independence movements the identity of the community that seeks independence is based on specific features that differentiate it from the dominant power, e.g. different language, distinctly different cultural elements, historical traditions, etc. Religion is often a key aspect of a specific identity; for example, the (Orthodox) Christian nations in Southeastern Europe seeking independence from the (Sunni) Muslim Ottoman Empire, or the (predominantly) Catholic Ireland from the Protestant-dominated British Empire.

The situation on the Korean peninsula at the beginning of the 20th century when the annexation of it by Japan happens is peculiar. On one hand, the spiritual cultural background of Korea, as in Japan and China, is informed by the same civilizational complex that has expanded its influence from Classical China of the first centuries CE, i.e. it includes the "three traditions" of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism, as well as the literature in the Classical Chinese language that is the foundation of the three most clearly defined East Asian civilizations that emerge from

it: China, Japan and Korea. On the other hand, each of these three civilizations have nurtured their own distinctive characteristics that make them markedly different from one another.

Korea and Japan have preserved many of their pre-Sinification cultural features. First of all, their languages are genetically and typologically distant from Chinese. Also, they have had different historical experiences through the centuries, especially through the last four or five centuries before the end of the 19th century.

For more than five centuries (1392 – 1910) Korea has been trying actively to build a (Neo-)Confucian state, while almost completely ignoring and even suppressing the Buddhist traditions. At the same time the privileged class of scholars during the end of this period, also known as the Joseon period, have also shown interest in spiritual quests. Two strong academic and religious movements have emerged in Joseon Korea: Seohak ("western learning") based on the study of Catholicism as revealed in books written in China in Chinese; and Donghak ("eastern learning") based on the study of doctrines and beliefs considered traditional of China and Korea, i.e. closer to the ancestors worshipped in the Confucian tradition.

Another key feature of the religious landscape of the Korean peninsula at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century is the spread of Protestantism. In the 1880s Protestant missionaries, mainly Presbyterians and Methodists from the United States of America, were successful in creating churches and baptizing numerous Koreans into Christianity. (According to some sources, about three quarters of Christians in South Korea today are Protestants.) In the early decades of the 20th century Pyongyang (the capital of North Korea today) was known as the "Jerusalem of the East". In the 1990s the North Korean Communist leader Kim Il Sung (shortly before his death) met with high-profile US TV evangelist Billy Graham.

Illustration 1: Billy Graham and Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang, North Korea

At the same time, the modernization of Korea at the end of the 19th century and the first several decades of the 20th century was accompanied by lively and intense religious activity, including the inception of new versions of older traditions, e.g. Won Buddhism (a new brand of Korean Buddhism established in the 1910s), as well as typical new religions combining elements from all sorts of different spiritual traditions with innovations to make them attractive for 20th-century modern people.

2. *The Clash with the Japanese Empire*

Japan started its modernization and "Westernization" processes several decades earlier than Korea. Japan's modernization of its spiritual and religious life was more or less from top down, meaning that the dominant nationalism of the political institutions quickly adapted traditional Japanese beliefs and practices into one unifying religious doctrine centered on the Emperor and presented as an "old" autochthonous religious complex with its own institutions and hierarchies. It was known as "State Shinto".

The Japanese tried to impose this complex on the Koreans as well. This forced "Shintoization" of the Korean peninsula started even before the annexation but was reinforced and institutionalized once the Korean peninsula was declared part of "metropolitan Japan".

In the field of the spiritual Japan ignored the Western traditions, tolerated the old traditions from China and the syncretic ones, and promoted the state religion based on indigenous and "pure" beliefs.

京城名所　朝鮮神宮　The Chosen Shrine, Keijo.
朝鮮の守護神にして南山の中腹に位置し五年六ヶ月の歳月と二百萬圓の工費を投じて大正拾四年十月完成し降神鎮座の儀を行ひたり而して表參道の石段實に三百八十五、東洋第一の稱ありと云ふ今や參道兩側の樹木繁茂し境內の森嚴愈々加り大京城市街を一望に收め得て風光誠に佳絕の地なり

Illustration 2: Early 20th century Japanese postcard showing the Chōsen Shrine in Seoul (1925-1945)

3. *Reaction to State Shinto Shrines*[13]

During the period of annexation to Japan (1910 – 1945) Korea was considered part of metropolitan Japan. Before the end of the Second World War the number of Shinto shrines (*jinja* in Japanese, *shinsa* in Korean) established in Korea by Japanese settlers (*kaigai jinja*) reached, according to Nitta (1997, 13) the number 74. However, according to Park (2000, 91) the number of all Shinto shrines on the Korean peninsula was 1062. Kang (1977), based on the Annual Report on Chosen, notes: "During Japanese rule in Korea practically every city, town, village and even

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[13] This section 3 and the following section 4 are almost entirely based on the research of Rangelov (2002, 113 – 122).

schools had Shinto shrines where the spirits of the Japanese ancestors, especially of Amaterasu Omikami, the sun-goddess, were worshipped."

Since the annexation of Korea in 1910, the expressed policy of the Japanese government had been to make all members of the subjected peoples into standardized Japanese subjects, both legally and psychologically. Forced worship at the Shinto shrines or daily bows in an eastern direction – to Tokyo – annoyed rather than converted Koreans (Kim 1997).

As for the Japanese government, Sakamoto (2000, 273) points out that it distinguished between shrines as "sites for the performance of state ritual" and religions institutionally.

Ever since assuming Korea's diplomatic functions in 1905 after the Russo-Japanese War, Japan tried to control religion. The government sought to regulate all religious matters and a number of laws and rules were issued regarding Confucian, Buddhist and other institutions, missions and places of worship (Park 2000, 91). All religious activities were to be controlled and approved by the Japanese Office of the Governer-General. At the same time, all religions in Korea underwent some form pf Japanization. For example, Buddhist temples "held memorial rituals on feast days of Japan or the birthday of Tenno, and erected inscriptions praising the glory and health of Tenno", while "the Presbyterian and Methodist churches, two major denominations of Korean Christianity, were annexed to Japanese Christianity with the modified names of Korean Presbyterian Church of Japanese Christianity and Korean Methodist Church of Japanese Christianity" (Park 2000, 91).

Although in the beginning, as Kang (1977, 104) points out, there was not much opposition to Japanese government from Buddhist and Confucian circles, there was negative reaction to Japanese religion and State Shinto from groups associated with indigenous beliefs and religions, most notably from such new religious movements as the Korean religion Ch'ondogyo.

4. The Korean Resistance

During the period of annexation and especially after the March 1, 1919 movement Koreans used their religious beliefs and loyalties as a form of resistance against the Japanese domination and as a symbol of the independence struggle. Koreans resisted the State Shinto religion. It was an alien organized religion that they were forced to accept despite them having different distinct traditions.

Korean Christians expressed their opposition to being forced to worship at State Shinto

shrines. They were not only denied their religious freedom but they were forced into practicing rituals they did not want to participate in.

Koreans protested the enforced religious limitations and actively combined the independence struggle with the struggle for their human rights and freedoms, especially their freedom of consciousness.

Students arrested for participating in independence demonstrations

The Shinto problem became a very serious issue in 1935 when "the Government ordered all educational institutions, including Christian schools, to make obeisance to Shinto shrine ceremonies. With the Japanese policy of national expansion Shino was used as "as an agency of political and military control" in Korea" (Kang 1977, 115). When the government introduced the policy of one *shinsa* per district, the number of shrines rose from 524 in 1936 to 1062 in 1945, and thus almost half of the 2229 districts in Korea has a shrine (Park 2000).

It is evident, at least from the literature on the subject, that reaction against the Shinto "state shrines" was most vocal among the Christians. Rangelov (2002, 118) provides the following explanation:

> Partly, it might be due to the different religious experience, but it also might be due to the fact that Christianity was still a religion that had come comparatively recently to Korea and East Asia and still needed to assert itself. There is also a widely acknowledged nationalistic element in the Christian protests, i.e. they were protesting as practising Christians formally, but also as Koreans to some extent. Christianity was not widely practised among the Japanese and that gave the Korean Christians a very different identity, all the more that they had received their Christianity mainly from the USA, which was viewed as then as a very powerful country. Of course, on the ground things were much more complicated.

One way to make Koreans participate in the Shinto shrine ceremonies was emphasizing that they were not religious but civil ceremonies. A high-ranking official even told visiting Christian leaders in 1936 that "attendance at the ceremonies was not an act of worship but an act of paying the highest respect to ancestors" (Kim 1997). However, Korean Protestants had a problem with that. Here is how Kang (1977, 115) explains it:

> Korean Christians, having abandoned the time-honored practice of ancestor worship as idolatrous, were not easily convinced that worship and obeisance to the Japanese ancestral spirits was not religious. In spite of the Government's efforts to persuade them, most Korean Christians opposed the Government's definition and refused to participate in Shinto ceremonies. Many Korean Christians believed that bowing to the shrines violated the First and the Second Commandments. An overwhelming majority of missionaries interpreted participation in Shinto ceremonies as definitely religious.

For the Protestants, the *shinsa* issue remained a very serious problem. They continued to oppose the definition of the non-religious nature of Shinto ceremonies. The mission of the Presbyterian Church of Victoria (Australia) issued a statement in which they expressed their respect toward the Emperor of Japan but stressed that "we … are unable ourselves to make such

obeisance or to instruct our schools to do so."[14] The opposition of the Presbyterian groups was very strong and their leaders recommended that missions close their schools. P'yongyang Presbyterian schools did not enrol any new students in 1937, and in May 1938, all Presbyterian schools throughout Korea were closed.

Finally, under a lot of pressure and harassment from the authorities the largest and the most powerful Christian denomination in Korea gave its approval for shrine attendance. In September 1938 the Presbyterians at their General Meeting in P'ongyang agreed, in undemocratic circumstances, to obey the Government order. As Kang (1977, 117) points out, this was "forced by unusual use of police power. Before the meeting of the assembly, attended by four hundred delegates, each delegate was brought to a police station and told to vote for participation in shrine ceremonies. When the session began, police officials sat facing the delegates; the police permitted no debate or negative votes. Whoever tried to leave the meeting was brought back by police escort."

During the war opposition against attendance was met by fierce persecution, including arrests and imprisonment. Two thousand Christian leaders were imprisoned and fifty of them were martyred. When Korea was liberated, practically all main sanctuaries of Shinto shrines were burnt and destroyed by Koreans. This indirectly shows that Koreans were never converted to Shintoism. As Kang (1977, 118) summarizes, "[w]hether Koreans participated in Shinto ceremonies as a civil act or opposed it as idolatrous practice, all Koreans in reality opposed the Japanese rule that identified so strongly with the folk religion of Japan."

5. Conclusions

Korean Christians emerged as one of main groups associated with active struggle for independence using peaceful means. Many Koreans came to examine and eventually appreciate their own religiosity and religious identity.

After the Liberation, the profile of Korean Christians has been rising even more as active participants in the building of the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Within relatively short period of time the national consciousness of the Korean people rose quickly. Koreans readily accepted modern and Western concepts, including national independence, personal freedoms, human rights, etc.

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[14] This is quoted by Kang (1977, 117)

Broadening their spiritual and religious lives in defiance of the forceful Japanization of Korean national identity and culture, Koreans managed to preserve their Korean national identity, enrich it with philosophical and religious traditions from all over the world, and continue these tendencies in their independent development of their society. Today the Republic of Korea is a vibrant democracy that has a rich and free political life that compares favorably to all its neighbors.

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WAR MAKING AND STATE MAKING: WHY TILLY CAN BE WRONG ON GEORGIA

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Abstract

Literature on state formation and state-building offer various accounts of how the most widely shared form of modern political organization, the territorial state has been formed and what can lead to successful state-building projects. According to Bellicist theory of state formation which is most widely associated with the works of Charles Tilly, external security challenges act as an important exogenous stimulus for state-building. Political entities embark on creating appropriate military, fiscal and administrative institutions to efficiently respond to threats coming from abroad. This paper attempts to apply Tillyan proposition of state formation to the case of Georgian state-building since the country regained its political independence as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The paper argues that national security challenges per se will not always lead to efficient state-building reforms. The role of ruling political elites and the level of their cohesion is instrumental. Fragmented and disunited elites will respond to the same external challenges differently from the elites with a higher level of intra elite cohesion. This will lead to different state-building reforms. Put shortly, fragmented elites will produce weak states, while coherent elites – strong states.

Keywords: *Georgia, National Security, Political Elites, Weak State, Strong State.*

Introduction

Literature on state formation and state-building offers various accounts of how the most widely shared form of modern political organization, the territorial state has been formed and what can lead to successful state-building projects. Different approaches emphasize different sets of variables at different levels of analysis. Amidst multiplicity of approaches, the proposition offered by famous sociologist Charles Tilly, War Makes States and States Make Wars, remains by large one of the most widely shared accounts of modern state formation. According to Tilly, external

security challenges facing political entities in late medieval and early modern Europe acted as the major exogenous stimulus for enacting state-building reforms. To survive in the harsh external security environment, political entities had to develop appropriate military, fiscal and administrative institutions which would then efficiently respond to threats emanating from the international system. The unintended results of these processes have been the formation of the modern state, with its political, military, fiscal and administrative institutions and functions.

This paper attempts to apply Tillyan proposition of state formation to the case of Georgian state-building since the country regained its political independence as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The paper argues that national security challenges per se will not always lead to efficient state-building reforms. The role of ruling political elites and the level of their cohesion is instrumental. Fragmented and disunited elites will respond to the same external challenges differently from the elites with a higher level of intra elite cohesion. This will lead to different state-building reforms. Put shortly, fragmented elites will produce weak states, while coherent elites – strong states.

What explains weak state-building measures during the presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze and accelerated state-building reforms after the Rose Revolution in light of the constantly vulnerable security environment? This is the major question that this paper will attempt to provide answers to.

The paper argues that while the bellicist account correctly posits the existence of external rivals and threats as the important exogenous stimulus for state formation and state-building reforms, it fails to capture the whole picture. External factors are important, though not sufficient causes for internal state-building reforms. To respond to external pressures efficiently and to produce state-building reforms associated with the bellicist account of state formation, a crucial role will be played by the level of cohesion of ruling elites of the country. If elites are fragmented and they do not agree on the nature of external threat and measures to be taken against it, one should not expect efficient state-building reforms which bellicist theory predicts. In contrast, if elites are coherent, united, and agree on the nature of external threat and strategy against it, efficient state-building reforms should follow.

The paths taken by Georgian state during the administrations of Shevardnadze and Saakashvili demonstrate that the elites and the level of their cohesion plays a significant role in determining

the pace, content, and the scope of state-building strategies adopted by decision-makers. Vulnerable external security environment, geopolitical challenges, and especially threats emanating from Russia were almost constant features of Georgia's external security environment since regaining independence. However, different elites responded differently to the same challenges: Shevardnadze's Georgia, due to internal elite divisions, almost approximated weak or failed state, while Georgia since the Rose Revolution due to increased coherence among ruling political elites became one of the fastest modernizers in the post-Soviet space.

This article will proceed as follows: in the next part, a brief discussion of the Bellicist theory and its critical assessment will be presented. The next chapter will provide ``a zoom-out view`` of Georgia's security environment. The following chapter will provide a discussion around two administrations' state-building reforms. The final part will summarize theoretical and empirical observations and will outline directions for future research for the state formation literature as well as for the state-building in Georgia.

How Wars Make States?

War makes states and states make war – classic proposition by prominent sociologist Charles Tilly (Tilly, 1975, 1985, 1990,) remains by large one of the most widely shared accounts of modern state formation within the fields of history, political science, and historical sociology. According to bellicist or predatory account of state formation, a modern state largely developed in response to war-making needs of political entities in late medieval and early modern Europe. A Revolution in military technology and an increase in the scope of warfare pushed political entities towards establishing military and administrative institutions, which would efficiently respond to external security threats (Bean, 1973). Those political entities, which managed to build efficient institutions, survived, which did not, were wiped out of the state system. This explains why the number of political entities in Europe vanished from 500 in 1500 to 25 in 1918 (Bean, 1973).

Tilly was not the only scholar emphasizing the role of national security in state formation. Other scholars earlier than Tilly have also noted the role of external threats in state formation. German historian Otto Hintze argued that all state organization was originally military organization, an organization for war (Hintze, 1975). He believed that the major cause of modern state formation was the defensive and offensive needs of the political entities of the medieval era. Besides presenting national security as the major cause of modern state formation, Hintze is one of the first

to emphasize the role that external threats and national security challenges have played in the domestic political organization of states. Put differently, Hintze argued that the nature of the external security environment affected not only the formation of states but the nature of their internal organization as well. According to him those states which were frequently involved in external aggression whether for defensive or offensive purposes tended to develop repressive political institutions, while states with less vulnerable external security environments had better chances of producing less repressive and more democratic political systems. According to Hintze, Britain's geographic insularity from continental Europe allowed it to maintain small armies and instead developed navy, which served both military and commercial interests. The Navy could not be as successfully used for domestic repression as armies could. As a result England produced more inclusive and open political system, while Prussia which faced almost constant threat of external aggression developed repressive state apparatus (Hintze, 1975).

But how can war, preparation for war and/or external rivalry specifically affect state formation/building? Before we describe a causal chain of the bellicist theory of state formation, we should agree on the definition of the major concepts of this paper: State and state-building. What is the state? What do state formation and state-building exactly mean in observable terms?

While literature offers various definitions, this paper will follow the Weberian approach to the state. Max Weber argued the state is, ``human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (Weber, 1918). According to this widely shared definition state is the political entity with a defined territory and normally with the monopoly on the use of force within that territory. Based on this definition, the modern state is different from other historical forms of political organization, including city-states, empires, or kingdoms. For instance, while the medieval kingdom had some formal attributes of a state, still it did not correspond to the Weberian understanding of the modern state. The territory of the kingdom never was clearly defined and usually, several centers of power co-existed within it. Kings, while supreme leaders, in reality, were constrained by internal rivals such as local lords who acted as local kings in their fiefdoms. Accordingly, what makes the modern state different from the medieval kingdom is its territorial nature with defined state borders (though clear demarcation of borders remains the pressing issue for many modern states) and monopolization of violence. Based on this understanding of the state, as the political entity which holds the monopoly on the use of

physical force within a particular territory, we can infer that state formation or state building refers to the processes of strengthening/increasing the state's administrative and coercive capacity.

But how, according to Tilly and others, did wars and external rivalry produce states? What are the causal chains and mechanisms linking war and state-building with each other? According to Tilly, war and external rivalry/aggression pushed political entities towards: 1) extracting financial and other resources from its subjects to support war-induced needs; 2) in the process neutralizing domestic competitors and eliminating rival centers of power, thus acquiring a monopoly on the use of violence within a particular territory and over the population inhabiting that territory 3) building efficient fiscal, military, police and other administrative institutions, which would support above-mentioned activities. Put differently, the war helped states to monopolize resources and increase their coercive and administrative capacity. Peter Gourevitch nicely captures the idea of bellicist theory in one sentence: ``This State of war induces states to organize themselves internally so as to meet these external challenges`` (Gourevitch, 1978). The unintended result of these steps was the creation and the strengthening of the modern state; which while having the shortest history among other historical forms of political organization, represents the leading form of political organization of the modern era. As Ertmann notes in his classic Birth of Leviathan, territorial state triumphed over all other alternative forms of governance (city-states, empires, kingdoms) because of its superior ability to fight (external wars) and coerce (internal dissent) (Ertmann, 1997).

Scholars attempted to apply the bellicist account of state formation to the current international system. Several modifications were made to the original version of the theory. Cameron G. Thies, one of the prominent scholars of state formation, tested Tillyan argument on the Middle East, Latin America, and South East Asia (Thies, 2012, 2005, Lu, Thies 2009). Thies concluded that the theory is still valid, though with minor modifications. He argued that not only actual war or preparation for war acts as the external stimulus for state-building and strengthening state institutions but the existence of strategic external rivals as well. According to Thies, strategic rivals and external security pressures push states to modernize themselves. Briefly put, strategic rivalries play the same role in Thies' modified version of the predatory theory, war plays with Tilly. Other scholars, who are more critical of Tillyan approach argue that the current international system significantly differs from the conditions which existed in late medieval and early modern Europe. Namely, ``state death`` while being a very high possibility in early modern Europe, today is almost non-

existent (Zacher, 2001). Because of the increasing importance of international law and rules-based international order and the increased importance of nationalism territorial conquests became more politically expensive. As a result, political entities, which once acquired statehood, have almost life insurance guarantees. Robert Jackson introduces the concept of ``negative sovereignty`` to explain state-building processes in Africa. He argues that while the majority of the states in Africa possess all formal attributes of statehood (territory, population, UN membership, etc) they lack empirical part of statehood (Jackson, 1986). The follow up of this argument, provided by Boaz and some other scholars, looks at how almost assured preservation of external statehood, will shift the focus of elites from the security of the state towards the security of their regime (Boaz, 2006/2007). As far as the ``state life`` is externally guaranteed, elites of the weak states will implement the policies leading to strengthening their hold on power rather than strengthening the state as an institution. Thus, such elites will support the strengthening of internal security forces, which are loyal to the ruling regime, rather than strong impersonal bureaucracies or militaries. Other scholars look at the diminished material benefit/value of territorial occupations and maintain that territorial aggrandizement does not pay as it used to do before the industrial revolution. As Zacher argues, ``Declining value of land as a factor of production in modern economies means that the conquest of foreign territory no longer brings the same benefits that it did in pre-industrial era`` (Zacher, 2001). Other groups of scholars argue that whether elites will decide to enforce state-building processes and reforms implied by bellicist theory will depend on the availability of resources. If the resources are easily available and can be obtained from outside (oil rents, foreign debt, etc) then elites have no incentive to extract resources from their population. The fact that there is no need to extract resources and tax the population, creates no incentives for regimes to invest in the development of administrative and bureaucratic apparatus which is crucial for revenue extraction. Miguel Centeno on the examples of state formation in Latin America and the Middle East argues that if resources which are needed for war are readily available as natural resources or external revenues such as borrowing from outside, then one should not expect mechanisms specified by predatory theory to hold (Centeno, 2002) In other words, states should look inward for resources to produce efficient taxation and fiscal and other administrative apparatus associated with tax collection. The negative impact of natural resources did not go unnoticed in other research as well. According to the theory of Resource Curse availability of rich natural resources such as oil will negatively affect the democratic accountability of the government (Schwarz, 2008, Ross,

2001).

After a brief discussion of the bellicist account of state formation, the next chapters will attempt to provide the analysis of how Tillyan approach can explain Georgia's state-building projects during two administrations.

National Security and the Georgian State: A Zoom-Out View

Georgia regained its political independence as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Newborn Georgian state faced a wide range of internal and external challenges. Ethno-political conflicts, civil war, internal social and economic problems, challenges coming from Russian involvement and interests in the region, became almost constant features of Georgian statehood (Siroky, 2017). Georgia's external security environment has been largely shaped by the presence of Russian power. Russia's involvement in Georgia's ethno-political conflicts and its muddling into Georgia's internal affairs were the major security challenges for the political independence of the state (Balance, 1997).

Georgia's security challenges were exacerbated by the fact that in the first half of the 1990's the potential external allies or partners who could mitigate or balance the negative influence of Russian power and threat, were unavailable. Western states and institutions' involvement in the region was very fragmentary and it lacked a coherent strategy towards the region. (Baran, 2002; Cornell, 2005; Mark, 1997).

Though, since the mid of 1990s regional balance of power starts to change gradually. The South Caucasus acquires significant strategic value, especially in light of the huge hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian Sea. The Western interest and the involvement in the region broadens. Two strategic projects, Baku-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipelines with the support of the United States are initiated and Georgia starts to play a pivotal role in both of them.

Increased involvement of the United States in the region gave Georgia chances to pursue pro-Western foreign policy despite the Russian objections. Georgia joined the Council of Europe in 1999, signed the Partnership for Peace agreement with NATO, and openly declared its intent to become a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. Georgia's pro-Western steps did not remain unnoticed by Kremlin and it also intensified its coercive strategy towards the country, which culminated in the full-scale war between two states in August, 2008. As a result of the War, two

breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, roughly 20 percent of Georgia's territory, were occupied by Russian military forces. Kremlin declared the political independence of both regions and initiated an active campaign to gain the international recognition of these entities, though with very limited success. Officially, Georgia regards Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as the occupied territories under the de-facto control of the Russian Federation (National Security Concept of Georgia, 2011).

National security challenges and the threats emanating from Russia are almost constant features of the Georgian state. However, the type of state-building reforms Georgia responded to the external pressures during two administrations, will be discussed in the following chapter.

From Weak to Strong State: Political Elites and the Georgian State-building Projects

During the 1990s, Georgia approximated a failed state. State institutions were unable to fulfill their basic functions and provide basic public goods. Corruption was widespread. Political, economic and social hurdles were almost constant features of Georgian polity. As we have noted elsewhere:

``The state was unable to collect taxes, provide adequate public services, take care of public infrastructure and provide adequate conditions to spur economic development. The dysfunctional institutions and limited state capacity under Shevardnadze's regime had a direct negative impact on the effectiveness of Georgia's domestic and foreign policies. His domestic policy, rooted in the lack of elite cohesion, was one of the main internal impediments`` (Gvalia et al, 2019).

As was noted by Borzel and Lebanidze, Shevardnadze's lack of modernization agenda affected not only levels of domestic support towards him and his regime, but international partners' attitudes towards his government as well. All this ultimately ushered in decreased international support and more isolation for the regime (Börzel and Lebanidze 2017).

Russian threat and Kremlin's involvement in Georgia's internal affairs was the constant feature of Georgia's internal politics and foreign policy. Though, while Shevardnadze himself recognized dangers coming from the North, due to the composition of his ruling elite which was a conglomerate of people with different ideological backgrounds and interests that could not reach consensus on vital issues of the country's domestic and foreign affairs, he could not mobilize internal resources for efficient state-building reforms. His administration was home to pro-Westerners like Mikheil Saakashvili and Zurab Zhvania, but also to pro-Russian politicians

especially from so-called ``power ministries``. These internal elite divisions affected regime's ability to mobilize resources for state-building reforms. Besides divided elites at the level of central administration, the Georgian state during the Shevardnadze administration faced challenges from the periphery as well. The region of Adjara, situated in the Western part of the country, with the strategic location at the Black Sea shores of the country, was out of the efficient control of the central administration. The local ruler, Aslan Abashidze, and his political and economic influences in the region made him look like the medieval lord, with supreme authority over his fiefdom. Not only did Abashidze refused to transfer revenues to the center and got involved in shadow economic practices, but he also challenged the foreign policy agenda of the country. While Shevardnadze was trying to push towards pro-western foreign policy, Abashidze urged to keep closer political and economic ties with Russia and even supported the extension of Russian troops' stay in the region. He strengthened his security forces loyal to his regime which was outside the effective control of the central government (Gvalia et al, 2019). Put briefly, during the Shevardnadze administration, Georgia, in great part due to internal elite divisions and inability to produce inter elite consensus on vital aspects of country's internal and external challenges, approximated the state which formally had the attributes of a modern state, though lacked empirical part of the statehood, including the monopoly on the use of force within its defined borders. Although Russian threat was always present, Shevardnadze's administration was unable to respond with the efficient state-building reforms which the bellicist theory of state-building anticipates.

But the situation started to change after the 2003 Rose Revolution, mass upheaval against Shevardnadze's regime, which ushered in the peaceful removal of his government from power. Most of the observers of Georgian politics believe that the major internal cause of the Revolution was the failed Georgian state (Siroky, Aprasidze, 2011). One can debate whether the Rose revolution led to a more democratic Georgia, but what no observer of Georgian politics questions is that the Rose Revolution definitely led to the stronger, administratively more efficient Georgian state (Siroky, Aprasidze, 2011). One of the major internal causes leading to this outcome was the increased coherence among the post-revolutionary ruling elites of the country. In contrast to its predecessor, the new government was ideologically homogeneous as concerned the key objectives. Political elites shared consensus on fundamental aspects of the country's strategic goals, the bulk of which consisted of internal modernization of the country and externally pushing for pro-Western foreign policy agenda (Gvalia et al, 2011). The first internal steps taken by the Saakashvili

administration focused on homogenizing political elites in the center and the periphery. One of the major initial success stories of the new government was the peaceful removal of the local lord of Adjara, Aslan Abashidze, who during the previous administration was out of effective control of Tbilisi. The removal of Abashidze led to the restoration of the central government's effective control over this important coastal region. Another local lord, who also refused to act within the rules set by the central administration of the country was Emzar Kvitsiani, also from Western Georgia, with openly pro-Russian sentiments. The new government managed to subjugate him as well. Put briefly, the state has managed to restore its efficient control over the whole territory of the country except for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two separatist enclaves under the efficient control of the Kremlin. New government's strategy to remove internal veto players whether from the center or the periphery proved to be successful. With this, the new government followed the mechanisms of state-building specified by Tilly and other scholars of state formation: state sought to improve its administrative capacity, solidified its monopoly on the use of violence and strengthened its tax collection ability:

``Saakashvili's first actions in office provided further evidence and followed a classic pattern of state-making: he sought to increase the state's reach, solidifying its monopoly on the use of force and bolstering its ability to collect taxes `` (Siroky, Aprasidze, 2011)

The new government quickly rebuilt weak state institutions. In a short time, it managed to instigate an efficient fight against corruptive practices and Soviet and post-Soviet criminal subculture of so-called Thieves in Law, strengthened law enforcement agencies and military, modernized state institutions, replaced old cadres with young and well-trained professionals. All these led to tangible results towards strengthening the overall administrative capacity of the state. Due to diminished levels of corruption and increased tax collection capacity of the state, the state budget increased six times in 4 years after the Revolution. This was followed by 4 times increase in exports and 6 times in imports. Foreign Direct investment increased five-fold and military budget twelve-fold (Gvalia and Lebanidze, 2018).

The difference in pace, content, and direction of the Georgian state-building project during two administrations demonstrate that political elites and the level of their internal cohesion will have a tremendous impact on the outcomes in the state-building projects. Put briefly, our assumption that divided elites will produce weak and inefficient states, while coherent ones – strong state, proves

to be solid and grounded.

Conclusion

This paper argued that while external threats represent the important exogenous stimulus for internal state-building reforms, the content, pace, and outcomes of these processes will ultimately depend on the nature of intra elite cohesion. Coherent elites are expected to produce efficient state institutions, while divided elites – failed and fragmented ones.

Russian threat, Kremlin's muddling in Georgia's internal affairs have been the constant features of Georgian internal and foreign affairs. Both Shevardnadze and Saakashvili recognized the dangers facing the country from the Northern neighbor. Though due to differences in elite cohesion, they were able to respond differently to the same external challenges. Saakashvili's government which consisted of a homogenous group of individuals who shared consensus regarding the country's ultimate objectives managed to produce efficient and modernized state institutions, while Georgia during Shevardnadze's administration, a conglomerate of individuals with competing ideologies and interests, approximated the failed state.

The Georgian case demonstrates that external threats do not automatically translate into efficient state-building initiatives. The role of an agency is important and literature on the bellicist theory of state formation should bring the internal composition of states, elites, and the nature of inter-elite organization into the focus alongside with external factors. With this shift, the bellicist theory can gain a lot from the Neoclassical Realist school of thought in international relations research.

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PROTOTYPE OF NAMED ENTITY RECOGNITION FOR KOREAN BASED ON FINITE STATE AUTOMATA

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Abstract

This paper introduces a prototype of Named Entity Recognition of Proper Nouns in Korean based on finite state automata. Named Entity Recognition is an essential functionality for any Text Analysis Applications. The field of Text Analysis Applications will be introduced and also different approaches to Named Entity Recognition functionalities will be briefly introduced and compared. Finite state approach provides simple implementation but accurate result with broad coverage. Korean is an agglutinative language with partial free word order and as Georgian language shares similarities with Korean language, this paper explores the Named Entity Recognition functionality with Georgian also.

Keywords: *Named Entity Recognition, Finite State Automata, Korean, Text Analysis*

Natural language Processing topic is widely researched in the field of Artificial Intelligence due to the vast amount of Big Data. Big Data is a vast amount of both structured and unstructured data and it can be defined with 3 words, "volume, velocity, variety". This reflects how Big data has vast amount in a variety of structure and needs to be quick in its interpretation. [1] There were many attempts to define Big Data and later on, a different perspective to use the 4 words were proposed; "veracity, variability, visualization, and value". [2]

Unstructured data are data that does not have predefined structure or patterns that are predictable. For example, blogs, forum postings, social media, email, surveys, books, documents, health records, audio, videos, web page, etc. that we use in our everyday life are filled with vast amount of unstructured data that has the potential to be analyzed and used in such efficient ways. This process of deriving high quality and useful information and converting unstructured data to structured data is called Text Analysis or Text Mining. [3]

Text Analysis has many subtasks in its field:

1) Word Sense Disambiguation: to disambiguate meaning of words based on context and their usages.

2) Named Entity Recognition: to recognize proper nouns

3) Morphological Analysis: to understand the structure of words

4) Syntactic Parsing: to understand the structure of words

5) Sentiment Analysis: to understand the sentiment of an expression

6) Information Extraction: to extract information for classifying and storing database

7) Topic Modeling: analyzed "bags" of words or groups of words

Named Entity Recognition recognizes entities that are related to people, location, organization, facility in unstructured data. This is a foundation stage that builds up to implement other Text Analysis applications, such as information extraction, question answering, coreference resolution, topic modeling etc.

Annie, Gate, and Stanford are one of the many open resources for NER tools.
Annie is a part of the basic Information Extraction pipeline of GATE and it identifies entity types Person, Location, Organization, Time and Date.
Stanford NER is a tool implemented in Java to recognize named entities such as Person, Company, Protein names, etc.

NER systems can be implemented based on dictionary-based system, rule-based system, machine learning based system, and hybrid system. [4] Dictionary-based system uses exact string-matching method and can also be stretched to use flexible matching method also. Rule-based system uses either patterns or context. There are 3 subcategories under machine learning based system. First, supervised learning method that includes HMMs, SVMs, CRFs using comprehensive annotated training corpus. Second, unsupervised learning method which clustering is one of the widely used method. Clustering automatically clusters into groups that have similar features to create their own rule and algorithm. Third, semi-supervised learning method that includes bootstrapping method. This bootstrapping method creates small annotations called 'seeds'.

Hybrid methods are preferred when implementing NER systems so that the benefits of rule-based and machine learning based can be used. Rule-based systems have high precision number and requires less training data whereas machine learning based systems have high recall number and can be robust along with less requirement of professional linguists.

Hybrid approaches can resolve shortcomings from each side as rule-based approach is domain dependent and changes over time are difficult. Also, machine learning based approach requires a lot of training data. There are many NER based on hybrid approach in various domains such as pharmaceutical, banking, education, government, etc. There is a research comparing the performance among rule-based, machine learning based, and hybrid for a Named Entity Recognition for Punjabi language. The result for hybrid showed F-score of approximately 75% compared to rule-based and machine learning based which showed approximately 40%. [5]

A prototype of NER for Korean can be implemented based on the hybrid system of rule-based approach and HMM supervised learning method.

Pattern matching for entities in phrases are defined as rules.

[PERSON], [TITLE] of [ORGANIZATION]
[PERSON], [ORGANIZATION:Genetive] [TITLE]

The above pattern can be used as a rule-based approach to recognize named entities in a phrase such as the following.

"Sundar Pichai, CEO of Google"
"이건희, 삼성그룹의 총수"

Word order is different in English and Korean and the word order for phrases in Korean and also its case (such as Nominative, Accusative, Genetive, etc) features are defined.

Also, the following pattern for:

[ORGANIZATION] in [CITY|COUNTRY]
[[CITY|COUNTRY]:[GENETIVE|LOCATIVE]] [ORGANIZATION]

For example,

"Google in Seoul"

"서울에서의 구글"

Also, the following patterns for:

[CITY] University
University of [STATE]

For example,

"Seoul University"

"University of Georgia"

"서울 대학교"

"제주 대학교"

In order to enhance the NER prototype and solve the limitations of rule-based approach, HMM supervised learning method is implanted to the system. The system receives raw text and annotates it, trains it and then final NER annotation is done. In the process of training and testing the annotation, it learns the transition and emission probabilities to find the best state sequence for a given observation.

The number of iterations to test and train the HMM supervised learning system can be stated as preferred and average iteration number that the protype used is 50.

There are many challenges in NER systems.

First, there are many variations of named entities.

For example,

"John Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. John Smith"

"홍길동, 홍씨, 홍길동씨"

Second, there are many ambiguities of named entities.

For example,

"May" can be a month, person's name, or even an auxiliary verb.

"Washington" can be a state or a person's name.

"새날이" can be a person's name or noun phrase

Third, the scope of named entities is difficult to define. Longest match brings the highest accuracy rate but can lower recall numbers.

Fourth, unstructured data are noisy and therefore, there are so many spelling errors, slangs, lacking of uniformed grammatical forms, abbreviations that will make the system perform with lower accuracy and recall, eventually lowering the overall F Score.

Conclusion

A prototype of Named Entity Recognition for Korean based on hybrid approach shows advantages in its accuracy and recall performance when using a hybrid approach that combines rules and HMM supervised learning method.

Korean is partially free in its word order and the pattern matching rules seems to be the most efficient method to implement NER system for free word order languages. Also, HMM supervised learning method facilitates and enhances the NER system by broadening the scope of domain and making the system more robust by recognizing different possible patterns and also unclean noisy data.

This prototype implemented for NER Korean can be future used as a foundation for higher level Information Retrieval applications such as Sentiment Analysis focusing on targeting entities,

Opinion Mining for business intelligence suites, Question and Answers Applications and also for comprehensive Business Analytics applications.

Also, this prototype can be applied to not only Korean but also other languages with free word order and agglutinative languages, such as Georgian using hybrid approach of rule based and HMM supervised statistical training method.

References

[1] Douglas, Laney. "The Importance of 'Big Data': A Definition". Gartner. Retrieved 21 June 2012.

[2] Blog post: Mark van Rijmenam titled "Why the 3V's Are Not Sufficient to Describe Big Data".

[3] Anujna M., Ushadevi A. "Converting and Deploying an Unstructured Data using Pattern Matching"

[4] Eltyeb, S., Salim, N. Chemical named entities recognition: a review on approaches and applications. J Cheminform 6, 17 (2014).

[5] Kanwalpreet Singh Bajwa and Amardeep Kaur. Article: Hybrid Approach for Named Entity Recognition. International Journal of Computer Applications 118(1):36-41, May 2015.

GEORGIA AND IRAN: RESULTS OF 30 YEARS RELATIONS AND NEW CHALLENGES

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Abstract

In the article the main characteristics of Georgian-Iranian relations after 1991 are studied. At the beginning, a brief survey of Georgian-Iranian historical interactions, the problem of historical perception of Georgia by Iranians, and vice-versa are presented. Following questions are analyzed after: Iranian politics towards the South Caucasian States after the dissolution of the Soviet empire and the place of Georgia in it; the influence of the political issues on economic relations of the two countries – how Western orientation of Georgia and its aspiration to become a member of NATO affect Georgian-Iranian relations; activities of Iranians in Georgia; factor of Russia on Georgian-Iranian relations; positive and negative aspects of interactions.

Keywords: *Georgia, Iran, South Caucasus, Turkey, Russia, USA, EU, sanctions, visa-free regime.*

The South Caucasus historically was and presently continues to be one of the key regions for Iran. The region constituted Iran's sphere of influence for centuries. A considerable part of it was under the direct and indirect rule of Iranian states. The dominance of Iran in Eastern Georgia was even stronger during the Safavid period (1501-1736). Iranian culture and political system had an enormous influence on Georgia. From the most ancient times, Iranian state system in Georgia was considered as a model. Close contacts are reflected in historical and literary sources, as well as in Georgian language, Georgian (including Tbilisi) toponyms, architecture, culture, etc. It should be pointed out that even today many Iranian scholars consider the South Caucasus a historic part of Iran.as a whole.[15] So, "from Iran's viewpoint, the Caucasus is not a foreign territory."[16]

The situation changed in the 19th century when due to the Russian empire's southward

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[15] See, for example: Manoucehr Moradi, Perspectives on European Union and Iran Cooperation in Provision of Stability and Security in Southern Caucasus. *Amu-Darya* (Iranian Magazine of Center for Caucasian and Central Asian Studies, 2006-2007, #21-22, 68, 83).

[16] M.-R. Djalili, Iran and the Caucasus: Maintaning some Pragmatism. *The Quarterly Journal*, V. 1, Issue 3, 2002, 49.

expansion the region shifted away from Middle Eastern empires. The relations between the two countries were not severed but acquired several new aspects. First and foremost, the relations were economic, as Georgia and its capital had gradually become a transit route for Iranian goods entering Russia and Europe, and vice versa. The second aspect involved the filtering of European and Russian ideas as well as cultural and technical advancements to Iran through Georgia. Yet another significant aspect was the social and cultural activity of the Iranian community of Tbilisi.[17]

Contacts of Iran with the South Caucasian region practically broke off after the creation of the USSR. Georgia, whose capital at the beginning of the 20th century was the important center of the Iranian intellectual life and where the opposition to the Iranian political regime was considerably formed, was cut off from Iran by the peculiar "Iron Curtain" for many years.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the situation unexpectedly changed. The new reality created new opportunities for Iran. The new state of affairs was followed by the awakening of historical memory from both sides, which was not mutually shared at all and which plays a certain role in present-day relations between Iran and the South Caucasian countries.

A different approach towards understanding history is explicit from both sides. Interactions with Iran are often seen in Georgia as relations between 'invaded' and 'invader'. At the same time, it is always highlighted that for centuries of relations with Iran Georgia maintained at least partial independence. Georgian kingdoms and principalities managed to maintain a system of local governance under the hegemony of Iran (this applies primarily to the Safavid era – the 16th-first half of the 18th cc.).

In fact, Georgia remained a Christian country, but during the Safavid era, for more than a century, kings of the Eastern Georgian Kingdom Kartli had to be necessarily Muslims. They belonged to the Georgian royal dynasty, but were appointed by the Shah of Iran and were his officials. Kartli was considered to be one of the provinces of Iran.

Iranian perception is the opposite: Historically, Georgia has been part of Iran. Even in the school textbooks, it is noted that the Eastern Caucasus has belonged to Iran, but due to the weakening of the Iranian Shahs, the Russian emperors have taken these lands away from them. The capital city of Georgia Tbilisi is perceived as a part of the Persianate world. The name of one

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[17] See, for example: George Sanikidze, "A Historical Survey of the Georgian–Iranian Relations in the Nineteenth Century." *Journal of Persianate Studies*. Leiden: Brill, v.1, No.2, 2008, 148-173; Marina Alexidze, *Georgia and the Muslim East in the Nineteenth Century, Studies in the History of Culture, Religion and Life*. Tbilisi, 2011.

old district of Tbilisi was *Seydabad*, where descendants of Imam Husayn lived. There are lots of tplaces in Tbilisi associated with Iran. So, Tbilisi represents some kind of *Lieu de memoir* in Iranian historical imaginary.

External actors, the political orientation of the South Caucasian Countries and Iran

Iran's policy in the South Caucasus is based on a pragmatic approach and takes Russian considerations above all. As M. Milani notes, „Iran's policies in the region have been more pragmatic, more business-oriented, and considerably less ideological than its policies toward immediate neighbors in other regions such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia.[18] It is also worth noting that "a predominantly secular posture toward the South Caucasus has made it all but imperative for Tehran to keep its Transcaucasia policy as distinct as practicable from its Middle East policy."[19]

Iran recognizes the dominant position of Russia in the region, at the same time is against the West (the US) becoming more active, and opposes Turkish interests. However, the history of cooperation between Iran and Russia (sometimes called even strategic) has also repeatedly witnessed conflicting interests. N. Kozhanov stresses: "In some issues, Russian and Iranian positions could be close but it is not necessary that they will coincide."[20]

Iran sees Russia as a counterweight of the West in the region and this factor prevails over the others. "Iran's relationship with Russia was becoming too important to risk over the South Caucasus."[21] For Tehran Moscow represents a tool for escaping the sanctions imposed by the US. Russia, which is under sanctions itself, perfectly understands that Iran liberated from sanctions, could become a fierce rival with gigantic reserves of oil and gas if Tehran gets the possibility to access the Black Sea coast with the most convenient and the safest route – Iran-Armenia-Georgia, and this way connect India and the Persian Gulf with the Black Sea.[22] At the same time, Russian

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[18] Mohsen Milani, Iran's Foreign Economic and Security Policy, in *Iran in a Reconnecting Eurasia* (Foreign Economic and Security Interests Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2016), 7.

[19] Mohaiddin Mesbahi and Mohammad Homayounvash, Iran and the Changing Geopolitics of the South Caucasus, in *The New Geopolitics of the Caucasus. Prospects for Regional Cooperation and Conflict Resolution*, ed. by Shireen T. Hunter (Lexington Books, 2017), 203.

[20] Nikolay Kozhanov, Russian–Iranian Dialogue After 2012: Turning a New Page? *Russian Analytical Digest* (November 10, 2016), #192, 3. https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD192.pdf. Accessed 09/17/2020. (About contradictions between Russia and Iran, see below).

[21] Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky and Paul Stronski, *U.S. Policy toward the South Caucasus: Take Three* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017), 9.

[22] Ruben Megrabian, Complimentary Foreign Policy of Armenia in the Context of Regional Crisis, in *Iran and the South Caucasus Republics*, ed. by Vali K. Kaleji (Tehran: Center for the Study of Iran and Eurasia, 2017) 48 (in

authorities clearly understood that any alliance or strategic partnership with the IRI would inevitably aggravate their relations with the leading countries of the world.[23]

However, the Russo-Iranian relations are fragile. While Russians consider themselves as the last bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism, the Iranians see Russia as a 'newcomer' in the region.[24] Attitude full of suspicions is also determined by historical factors. Russian interference in the country's affairs in the 19th and 20th centuries is deeply rooted in the memory of Iranians. Russia aims to be the main player in its southern neighborhood. Therefore, Moscow is opposed to the significant presence of any other regional power with ethnic and cultural affinity with the indigenous peoples of this region.[25] In this aspect, the South Caucasus stands indeed close to Iran. So, the Iranian-Russian relations were primarily like a marriage of convenience and a matter of mutual commercial benefit. Each seemed suspicious of the other and was willing to take opposing positions when it suited its immediate interests.[26]

Concerning Turkey, there are some obstacles to friendly relations between Turkey and Iran in the region. The idea of the unity of Turkic people is perceived negatively in Iran. With the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organization (BSEC) Turkey has created her economic cooperation organization excluding Iran. Turkey's good relations with Azerbaijan forces Iran to turn even more towards Russia to compensate for its international isolation.[27] In 2008, Former Turkish Prime Minister and current President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is known to have proposed the idea of creating an organization of security and cooperation in the Caucasus that should include Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, and Russia. Iran, however, was not

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Russian).

[23] Kozhanov, Reassessing Foreign Policy Priorities during the Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Khatami Era (1989-2005), in *Iran's Strategic Thinking: The Evolution of Iran's Foreign Policy, 1979-2018* (Gerlach Press, 2019), 77. In 2016 Ali Aqbar Vilayeti, former Foreign Affairs Minister and currently advisor to Iran's Supreme Leader in foreign policy, during his visit to Moscow stated that there are perfect conditions for establishing Alliance between Russia, Iran, Syria and *Hezbollah*. Clearly, Russia will not allow for open alliance with *Hezbollah*, and therefore Foreign Affairs Minister of Russia noted that plan for creating such alliance does not exist.

[24] Eva Rakel, Paradigms of Iranian Policy in Central Eurasia and Beyond, *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, (Leiden: Brill, 2003), Vol. 2, issue 3-4, 561.

[25] Shireen Hunter, *Iran's Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), 106.

[26] Gary Sick, "Iran's Foreign Policy: A Revolution in Transition," in *Iran and the Surrounding World, Interactions in Culture and Cultural Politics*, edited by Nikki R. Keddie, & Rudi Matthee (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2002), 365.

[27] M.P. Amineh, Sicherheit und Entwicklung in Eurasien—neue Gedanken zur Geopolitik im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, in *Jahrbuch für Internationale Sicherheitspolitik*, vol. I, edited by E. Reiter (Hamburg: Emittler, 2002), 278.

among these countries, which has riled Tehran. After the 2020 Azerbaijan-Armenia war, Erdoğan came up with the idea again and this time he added Iran to the list. But today and in a short-term perspective, there is no possibility to the create such an organization.

As E. Herzig notes, "Iran's regional projects-ECO, the proposed Caspian Sea Cooperation Organization and the Association of Persian- Language Speakers... were to some degree responses to the Turkish- sponsored Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and the Turkic Summit."[28]

UN Security Council and US sanctions have been and still are in place against Tehran. In theory, Iran is the competitor to Turkey in the region, but in practice, it cannot threaten the interests of Ankara in the region, as it has limited leverage to pursue its interests.

The South Caucasian countries have chosen different political vectors. Armenia became a strategic partner of Russia; Georgia was formed as a pro-western state; while Azerbaijan chose impartiality and neutrality. At the same time, rapid changes both in the region and globally force all three countries to pursue somewhat flexible policies. Different political vectors have led to different approaches of the three countries towards Iran.

In this regard, attention should be paid to the place of Iran in 'National Security Strategy' documents of the South Caucasian countries.

The Armenian document underlines: "The imposition of broad international economic sanctions on Iran would... directly threaten the National Security of the Republic of Armenia." Attention is paid to the importance of cooperation between the two countries and it is mentioned that Armenia also values Iran's engagement in various processes in the South Caucasus region and regards it a factor contributing to maintaining balance and stability in the region.[29] In the National Security Strategy concept of Azerbaijan is stressed, that Azerbaijan is interested in promoting mutually beneficial relations with Iran in political, economic, cultural, and other areas. Azerbaijan "attaches great importance to its relations with neighboring Iran... [with which it] share[s] a common rich historical and cultural heritage."[30] While in the National Security Strategy concept of Georgia Iran is mentioned only once among the many countries with which Georgia will

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[28] Edmund Herzig, Regionalism, Iran and Central Asia, *International Affairs*, *Regionalism and the Changing International Order in Central Eurasia* (Oxford University Press, May, 2004), Vol. 80, #3, 507.

[29] *Republic of Armenia. National Security Strategy*. https://www.mfa.am/filemanager/Statics/Doctrineeng.pdf. Accessed 09/15/2020.

[30] *National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan.*
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154917/Azerbaijan2007.pdf. Accessed 09/15/2020.

continue economic cooperation.[31]

Iran gains particular importance for Armenia with the existence of a 'Turkish enemy' (Turkey and Azerbaijan) when Georgia is the strategic partner of these two countries and is in confrontation with Russia.

Georgia's politics differ in many ways from Armenia and Azerbaijan. Georgia is the most pro-Western and anti-Russian country in the region. First of all, some main characteristics of today's Georgian politics must be pointed out which don't help rapprochement of two countries: 1) 'Cold war' between Russia and Georgia. 2) Turkish-Georgian close relations. 3) Georgia's pro-Western aspirations and close ties with NATO.

Georgia's political vector towards the West and for NATO membership strongly distinguishes it from its two Caucasian neighbors. Weakening of the US and Turkish influence in Georgia is important for Iran, but in this case, Iran is powerless and perfectly realizes this.

It is noteworthy, that after the war of 2008, relations between Iran and Georgia, except for minor incidents[32] have advanced pretty much. For example, in 2010 Georgia supported a nuclear agreement initiated by Brazil and Turkey, which was opposed by Washington.[33] Surprisingly, in 2012 on the joint military exercises of US marines and Georgian troops, the Georgian side invited Iran's military attaché. They stated at the Ministry of Defense of Georgia that this invitation had been standard procedure.[34] but for that period, when there are signs of warming relations between Iran and the West and when contours for reaching nuclear deal were visible, this kind of action from the Georgian side seems to be quite pragmatic – an attempt of playing the role of mediator between the US and Iran.

In 2008, relations between the two countries hit a low when Georgia extradited an Iranian citizen to the US to face charges related to breaking the arms embargo against Iran - an action that Tehran assessed as an anti-Iranian act. After this incident, relations between the two countries were

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[31] *National Security Concept of Georgia.* https://mod.gov.ge/uploads/2018/pdf/NSC-ENG.pdf. Accessed 09/15/2020.

[32] The main incident was related to the arrest in Tbilisi of Iranian citizen Amirhoseyn Ardebili in 2007. In January 2008, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran attended inauguration of president Saakashvili, however the main reason of his stay in Tbilisi was to ensure that Ardebili would not be extradited to US to face charges related to breaking the arms embargo against Iran. He did not succeed and this became the reason for cooled down political relations between the two countries for two years (2008-2009). In January 2010, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia Grigol Vashadze conducted a successful visit to Iran, which has put an end to 'Ardebili crisis'.

[33] Alexei Barrionuevo and Sebnem Arsu, Brazil and Turkey Near Nuclear Deal with Iran, *New York Times* (May 16, 2010), www.nytimes.com /2010/05/17 /world /middleeast/17iran .html. Accessed 02/27/2021.

[34] Molly Corso, Georgia Invites Iran to Joint US Military Exercises," (March 23, 2010), www.eurasianet.org/node/65170. Accessed 01/30/2021.

frozen for a short time. But soon Iran and Georgia reached an agreement on a visa-free regime. A visa-free regime for Iranian citizens has been introduced on January 26, 2011. Thus, Georgia became one of 40 countries of the world where Iranians could travel without a visa. In this situation, Georgia became one of the favorite destinations for Iranian tourists. A visa-free regime also helped to intensify economic relations (see below).

In 2013, in the frame of the new emigration law, Georgia canceled a visa-free regime for Iranian citizens. These actions by the Georgian government elicited a sharply negative response among Iranian official circles, experts, and regular citizens. However, Tehran did not take retaliatory actions and retained the visa-free regime for Georgian citizens. After the 'Nuclear agreement', in February of 2016 Georgia re-introduced a visa-free regime.[35]

From a political standpoint, Georgia-Iran's present relations can be described as a 'cold good neighborhood'. Currently, incompatibility of political interests excludes the possibility of rapprochement of these countries, but relations are normal (though unlike Armenia and Azerbaijan high-level visits are infrequent).

In general, 'Georgian-Iranian relations are not simply determined by bilateral decisions but exist in the context of Iran's and Georgia's relationship with the West.'

The unconditional pro-American position of Georgia was recently again illustrated by the fact that Georgia was the only country in the region to openly support American operation of the liquidation of Iranian General Qasem Soleymani.According to the official statement Washington has the right to protect its citizens anywhere in the world, while Armenia and Azerbaijan officially expressed condolences to Iran for the death of the General.[36]

Another issue that is often discussed by analysts is the transformation of US-Iranian tensions to an open military confrontation and the place of the South Caucasus in this possible confrontation. There is a certain fear from the side of Iran that Georgia can be used as a strategically important place for the West in case of the realization of military action against Iran.

Cultural and religious activities of Iranians in Georgia

It was mentioned above that Iran's policy in the South Caucasus is based on a pragmatic approach.

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[35] Concerning the visa-free regime and its consequences, see: Nikoloz Nakhutsrishvili, George Sanikidze, Georgia and Iran: Results of 25 Years Relations and Future Prospects, *The Near East and Georgia* (2016), #9, 306-229.
[36] See: Joshua Kucera, Caucasus braces for conflict in neighboring Iran (January 6, 2020). https://eurasianet.org/caucasus-braces-for-conflict-in-neighboring-iran. Accessed 01/27/2021.

'Tehran also demonstrated a willingness to ignore or neglect their Shia brethren when national security demands it.'[37] Nevertheless, Iran uses religious factor as a soft power when confronting Azerbaijan, while strengthening positions among the local Azerbaijani population in Georgia.

One of the objectives of Tehran in Georgia is to gain influence on its Azerbaijani citizens and therefore to weaken Baku's impact. Logically, the common bond of Shi'a Islam should bring Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan closer. Yet in practice, this has been a source of estrangement between them because the secular government of Azerbaijan has been wary of Iran's influence among its Shi'a population.[38] Such obstacle in Georgia is less visible and consequently, there is much more possibility for Iranians to propagate the Iranian version of Islam (i.e. the values of the Islamic republic).

The major Muslim group in Eastern Georgia is Azerbaijanis. The competition of the Turkish and Iranian organizations is most noticeable among the Azerbaijani population of Eastern Georgia which, through a low level of religious education, sometimes can't even distinguish Sunni and Shi'a branches. Iranian and Turkish 'charitable' organizations try to 'convert' them to 'their' religion. Recently the propagation of the "Salafi' Islam also created obstacles for Iranian and Turkish organizations.

There are two main Iranian Foundations presented in Eastern Georgia (including Tbilisi): Grand Ayatollah of the Shi'a world - al-Sistani (who lives in Iraq, but the funding is provided from Iran) and the Supreme leader of the Islamic Republic –Ayatollah Khamenei. There are Shi'a madrassas and mosques functioning through the financial aid of these foundations in towns and villages of Eastern Georgia inhabited by Azerbaijanis, young are sent for religious education in Iranian religious schools, universities, etc.

In the 90s of the past century, the activities in the fields of science, education, and culture were mainly undertaken by the Iranian Embassy, which assisted high schools and educational institutions which taught Iranistic disciplines (Persian language and literature, the history of Iran). Due to the material and technical assistance rendered by the Iranian Embassy, the so-called "Iranian Centers" were opened., Due to the efforts of the Embassy, Iranian religious centers were opened in Tbilisi and Georgian regions inhabited by muslims, e.g. in 2001 a branch of Great

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[37] Barbara Ann Riefeer-Flanagan, *Evolving Iran. An Introduction to Politics and Problems in the Islamic Republic* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 158.
[38] Hunter, 171.

Ayatollah Sistani Institute „Al ul-Beit" was opened in Tbilisi.

For several years a representation of "Al-Mustafa University" (Qom) had existed in Tbilisi, mainly dealing with the translation and publication of religious literature in Georgian. Both institutions cooperated with the Georgian Orthodox Church and St. Andrew University of the Georgian Patriarchate.

Concerning the study of Iranian students in Georgia, there is still a problem associated with the recognition of Georgian diplomas in Iran. Hence the Ministry of Education and Science of Georgia must work hard to resolvle the issue.

Trade and economic relations

After the collapse of the Soviet Union Iran obtained an excellent possibility to enter the new markets in the South Caucasus. Using this region as a transit route is another important issue.

Economic relations between Iran and Georgia, compared to Caucasian neighbors, are quite modest. There is no official data about the total amount of Iranian investments. Amount of imports in 2018 was $177.742 million, while export amounted to $77.155 million. In 2017 252,984 Iranians visited Georgia and in 2018 their number decreased to 127,641. [39]

It should be noted, that enhancement of the economic relations was quite visible from the beginning of the 21st century. Between 2005 and 2013, bilateral trade with Iran has grown at more than 20 percent each year, making it Georgia's third-fastest-growing bilateral partnership, though the overall value of trade is still comparatively low.[40] The deepening of economic relations was especially facilitated by the abolition of the visa regime. Iranian business became quite active in Georgia, several Iranian companies were opened. Between 2015-2019, 42% of the real estate sold in Georgia was bought by Iranian citizens.[41] However, despite such progress, one of the major obstacles facing trade between the two countries is the difficulties of bank transfers. Another is the tightening of rules of entry into Georgia for Iranian citizens (despite the visa-free regime). In the first half of the2019 13,165 people were denied entry to Georgia and 5,656 (42%) of them were Iranian citizens.

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[39] *Statistical Yearbook of Georgia* (2019), 62, 64, 230.

[40] Andrew C. Kuchins, Jeffrey Mankoff and Oliver Backes, Georgia's Foreign Economic and Security Policy, *Georgia in a Reconnecting Eurasia.* Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS) (2016), 21.

[41] http://www.tabula.ge/ge/story/154238-iranidan-motkhovnis-shemtsirebis-gamo-sakartvelos-ekonomika-80-milion-dolars-dakargavs. Accessed 09/10/2020.

However, there were suspicions that many Iranian companies in Georgia were laundering money. The growth of economic ties has raised concerns in some Western capitals, which worried that Iran was using Georgia as an outlet to bypass sanctions while using economic ties to establish political influence in Georgia. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps alone was reported to own 150 front organizations in Georgia.[42]

Elimination of the visa-free regime in 2013 (which was restored in 2 years) is specifically connected to the pressure from the side of the US because of illegal activities of Iranian businesses.

The transit route of Georgia to the Black Sea and then towards European ports is of particular importance for Iran. Georgia, unlike Armenia and Azerbaijan, has the access to the sea, therefore represents a major transit route both for the Caucasus and for Central Asia. B. Shaffer calls this position of Georgia "a central geopolitical prize" and stresses that "Georgia was an especially important target for Russian intervention since its location makes it a geographical lever for control of all of Central Asia and the Caucasus."[43]

In 2014, in a meeting with the new ambassador of Georgia, Iranian President Rouhani stated: "We value our relations with Georgia. Your country represents an exit to the Black Sea ports for Iran... which is of primary importance for us. In this regard, it is impossible not to assess positively construction of the railway from Iran to Georgia."[44]

The 2015 accord between Tehran and the P5+1 (the UN Security Council's permanent five members, plus Germany) over Iran's nuclear program was welcomed in Tbilisi. Lifting the sanctions on Iran and its return to the world stage created new perspectives in the sphere of trade and transit for Georgia.[45]

In 2018 the US left the "nuclear deal" signed with Iran and re-imposed suspended sanctions. Sanctions were accompanied by even more dire consequences of Covid-19. This primarily refers to Georgia and Armenia, where tourism is one of the leading spheres of economy and where the

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[42] Benoit Faucon, Jay Solomon, and Farnaz Fassihi, As Sanctions Bite, Iranians Invest Big in Georgia, *Wall Street Journal* (June 20, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com /articles /SB10001424127887323864304578320754133982778. Accessed 07/11/2020.

[43] Brenda Shaffer, The Geopolitics of the Caucasus, *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, (Vol. 15, #2, Spring/Summer 2009), 136, 133.

[44] President: the Rail Road Expanding Iran-Georgia – for the Benefit of the Whole Region // isna.ir. 04/23/2014. Accessed 05/03/2020.

[45] Georgia's parliamentary speaker noted that "Iran may turn into a stabilizing factor in the Middle East. Georgia has a chance to play an important role in relations between Iran and the West." See: "Tbilisi Welcomes Iran Nuclear Deal," *Civil Georgia* (July 15, 2015).
http://www .civil.ge /eng /article.php?id=28436. Accessed 06/07/2015.

share of Iranian tourists was significant.

It is worth mentioning that in 2019, Armenian and Georgian companies were affected by the sanctions imposed on Iran. [46]

In the present situation, it is very difficult to speak about the deepening of economic ties and especially about the transit potential of the South Caucasus for Iran. Enhancement of economic cooperation is only possible if there is a significant breakthrough in the US- Iran relations.

Caspian oil and gas transportation issue is a perfect example of the crash of the 'two great axes': Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline are controlled by the West; therefore, in this case, Russia remains left out, hence interests of 'Gazprom' are damaged. "These pipelines sometimes called 'political pipelines', bypass Armenia and Iran even though these countries offer the most direct route to the Mediterranean Sea."[47] This decision is easy to explain: together with containment of Russia, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and confrontation of the US with Iran.

Iran exports natural gas only to Armenia. The gas pipeline between Iran and Armenia opened on March 19, 2007. On the one hand, for Armenia, this is a source for energy security; on the other hand, this can become a transit route for Iranian gas in the future. 'Iran's gas exports to Armenia represent the main axis of bilateral economic ties, which is of strategic importance.'[48]

The pipeline diameter was initially much bigger, but because of the pressure from Moscow, it was reduced. Moscow only accepted the entry of Iranian gas on the Armenian market with this precondition. As a result, the import of gas from Iran (approx. 500 million cubic meters) is considerably less compared to the import from Russia (2 billion cubic meters).[49] 'Russian company 'Gazprom', it is not willing for this pipeline to provide gas to other markets in the future, and

[46] The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the US Department of Commerce has imposed sanctions on *Yerevan Telecommunications Research Institute (YETRI), Markel*, and *Georgia Petrochemical* and *Aviatech*. *Georgia Petrochemical* and *Aviatech* were sanctioned over unlawfully attempting "to procure and divert export-controlled aluminium tubing via Malaysia to Iran." The BIS decided to add Markel and YETRI to the sanctions entity list because the two companies obtained "items that were reexported without the required BIS licenses. See: Dominik Istrate, US imposes sanctions on Armenian and Georgian companies for Iran links. https://emerging-europe.com/news/us-imposes-sanctions-on-armenian-and-georgian-companies-for-iran-links/ (August 16, 2019). Accessed 09/09/2020.
[47] Julien Zarifian, Christian Armenia, Islamic Iran: Two (Not so) Strange Companions Geopolitical Stakes and Significance of a Special Relationship, *Iran & the Caucasus* (2008), Vol. 12, #1,140-141.
[48] Elaheh Koolaee and Mohammad Hossein Hafezian, The Islamic Republic of Iran and the South Caucasus Republics, *Iranian Studies* (June 2010), Vol. 43, #3, 496.
[49] Thomas de Waal notes that there is an opinion that Georgia can export natural gas from Iran through Armenia "which if fulfilled would end Azerbaijan's monopoly on gas imports too." Thomas de Waal, Azerbaijan's perfect storm, *Carnegie Europe*, (19 January 2017). But in the current situation, in medium terms, this should be excluded.

especially not to Georgia.'[50]

Iran and the conflicts in the South Caucasus

Iran has quite a careful position when it comes to the conflicts in the South Caucasus. Primarily, this refers to the conflict of Armenia and Azerbaijan near the Iranian border over Nagorno-Karabakh.[51]

Iran holds more careful position on the war of 2008 between Georgia and Russia. Firstly, this is determined by the fact that Iran cannot contradict Russia, whose dominant position in the region is recognized by Iran. On the other side, Iran still wants to maintain good neighboring relations with Georgia. As mentioned before, Iran perfectly understands the importance of Georgia in terms of transit. Due to the above-listed factors, the Iranian government practically refrained from assessing the conflict.

The war naturally attracted a lot of attention in Iran. For example, Iranian scholar A. Amid notes, that after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the destruction of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq in 2003, the Caucasus conflict was the most important international event, that changed many things not only on regional but also on the level of international relations. With this war, the Kremlin demonstrated, that the region that Europe needs for the transportation of energy resources, is not stable and is not a safe route for the realization of the goals of the West.[52]

This view fits into the concept of Iranian policy towards the South Caucasus - any issue (whether it refers to conflicts, territorial disputes, pipelines, etc.) should be decided by all countries of the region, which apart from the South Caucasus countries also includes Iran, Russia, and Turkey. External actors (first of all the US) should not interfere in the internal affairs of the region.

Without deciding to condemn the aggression of Russia in Georgia, Iran at the same time has officially declared the support of sovereignty and territorial integrity of any country and has

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[50] Vladimir Socor, "Iran-Armenia Gas Pipeline: Far More than Meets the Eyes", *Eurasia Daily Monitor* (The Jamestown Foundation, March 21, 2007). https://jamestown.org/program/iran-armenia-gas-pipeline-far-more-than-meets-the-eye/. Accessed 09/12/2020.

[51] Because of Karabakh conflict 132 km from 733 km border between Iran and Azerbaijan was controlled by the unrecognized republic of Karabakh. This fact was reflected in Azerbaijan's security concept paper and was considered as a threat. After the 2021 fall war Azerbaijan regained control on this area.

[52] Ali Amidi, "Eba'd-e beinolmelali-e bohran-e gorjestan va asar-e an bar manafe' meli-e iran". *Etelaat-e siasi-e eghtesadi*, (#252, 2008), 58.

emphasized the fidelity to the international standards and agreements. As a consequence Iran also has refused to recognize separatist regions of Georgia supported by Russia.[53]

In general, Tehran has been presenting the 2008 August war as an object of a lesson to the countries of the Persian Gulf: Georgia had made a mistake since it took the US promises for granted and now it has to pay an immense price for its naivety. Therefore, the regional countries would be better off establishing closer links with Iran in the security sphere, rather than looking toward unpredictable America.

As P. Goble notes, the recognition of the separatist regions of Georgia '...would further isolate Iran from other countries and may not even be what Russia wants at present.'[54]

On the other hand, the rapprochement of Georgia with Iran does not correspond to the Russian interests and several times Russian officials tried to 'show' to Iranians that Georgia is an ally of the USA and it will be used by Americans in case of military action against Iran.

Even in this regard, the pragmatism of Iranian politics towards Georgia is evident. For example, Tehran quite tolerantly perceives the participation of the Georgian militaries in anti-terrorist operations of the West in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is worthy to note that considering Georgia as a pro-western country, Iran has an opportunity to use Tbilisi as the channel for possible negotiations with the West.

It should also be mentioned here, that after the war of 2008 relations between Georgia and Iran entered into more active phase (visa regime abolition, higher activity of Iranian business in Georgia, sharp increase of the number of Iranian tourists). Therefore, despite the difference in political vectors both countries express, within existing possibilities, a desire for mutually beneficial cooperation.

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[53] See, for example: Sanikidze, "Turkey, Iran and the South Caucasus: Challenges for Regional Policy after the 2008 August War," *Electronic Journal of Political Science Studies* (Vol. 2, #1, January 2011), 78-89. http://www.esbadergisi.com/index.php?lang=en. Accessed 09/08/2020. It is noteworthy, that in February 2009, Iranian ambassador to Russia at a time Seyed Mahmoud-Reza Sajjadi stated that Iran would not recognize independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia any time soon "as it can cause war in many areas". FARS News Agency. 2009-02-07. Quoted: Vali Kaleji, Current Trends in the Political and Security Dimension of the South Caucasus. A View from Iran (Institute for Security Policy (ISP), August 2020). Working Paper 31. https://www.institutfuersicherheit.at/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ISP-Working-Paper-Vali-KALEJI-Current-Trends-and-Tendencies-in-the-Political-and-Security-Dimenstion-of-the-South-Caucasus.-A-View-from-Iran-.pdf, 11. Accessed 01/20/2021.

[54] Paul Goble, "Tehran Expanding Efforts to Counter US, Israel and Turkey Across South Caucasus," Eurasia Daily Monitor (December 12, 2019), Vol.16, Issue 173. https://jamestown.org/program/tehran-expanding-efforts-to-counter-us-israel-and-turkey-across-south-caucasus/ Accessed 09/05/2020.

Conclusion

The collation and analysis of the major aspects of Iranian-Georgian relations demonstrate that because of the obligations towards its Western partners, Georgian authorities were sometimes obliged to take undesirable and even harmful steps for Iran. Georgian side called them temporary acts and stressed that in the case of the lifting of sanctions, Georgia also will review its unpleasant decisions for Iran. Iranian side, despite the critical assessments, treated 'with understanding' this situation considering that Georgia wasn't independent in making such decisions.

In the case of full return of Iran on the international arena, economic relations between two countries can be developed in three directions: the increase of travelers (it does not concern only Georgia but also Iran which has great touristic potential), intensification of business contacts, investments.

Georgia can propose liberal and stable business environment to Iran. There are different investment opportunities (hydropower, tourism, real estate etc.). Georgia can become a transit road for Iranian goods (by highways and rail to Georgian Black seaports). In the long-term perspective extension of pipelines via Georgian territory isn't excluded. It's even possible to extend the Black Sea fiber optic line (local Iranian slow internet connection is very below to the average international level).

Considering Georgia's favorable geographical position, and Iran's rich energy resources and commercial-economic potential, in the case of the full lifting of sanctions, planning, and realization of a new important project in the mid-time perspective, Georgia can become a bridge between Europe and Iran. It refers the transit of Iranian energy resources and the shipping of Iranian cargos towards several destinations via Georgia territory.

In the end, it must be stressed that considering the general instability in the Middle Eastern region, especially in Syria and Iraq, and Russia's active participation in these process, contradictions among Iranian leaders about country's relations with the West, it is only possible to make an extremely cautious assumption about the future of Iranian-Georgian relations.

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INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT AND EFFORTS TO PRESERVE NATIONAL IDENTITY AND LANGUAGE BY MAKING KOREAN DICTIONARY IN THE JAPANESE COLONIAL PERIOD

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Abstract

잘 알려진 바와 같이 대한민국은 1919년에서 1945년에 이르는 35년간 일본제국주의의 침략을 받고 식민지화되었던 역사적 경험을 갖고 있다. 이 시간 동안 다양한 민족 정체성 보존과 독립 운동이 이루어졌으며, 그 중에서도 가장 중요한 움직임은 바로 우리 말, 한글의 보존 노력이었다. 일본 제국주의는 점령 시기가 지난 감에 따라 일본어를 공용어화하고 한글은 말살하는 한글 말살 정책을 지속적으로 펼치게 된다. 여기에 창씨개명, 조선어학회 등에 대한 탄압은 그 강도를 높이는 계기가 되었다. 한 나라의 사전의 편찬은 언어 규범화의 결정체로서 언어 정립의 최선의 방법이라고 할 수 있다. 그래서 각 나라마다 앞 다투어 자신들의 모국어 사전을 만들고 고도화하려는 노력을 오늘도 하고 있는 것이다. 본 연구에서는 일제 시대 국어 보존을 위한 사전 편찬 작업의 과정을 일람하고, 그 이후의 발전 과정에 대하여 연구해 보았다. 이 연구를 통하여 우리민족이 자신의 민족적 정체성을 잃고 가장 어려움을 겪고 있던 시기에 그 민족적 정체성 보존과 독립을 위한 운동으로서의 사전 편찬 작업을 새롭게 자리매김시키고자 한다.

I.   Introduction

As is well known, the Republic of Korea has a historical experience of being invaded and colonized by Japanese imperialism for 36 years from 1919 to 1945. During this time, various national identity preservation and independence movements were carried out, and the most important movement

among them was the efforts to preserve Korean language, Hangeul. Japanese imperialism continues to implement a policy to annihilate Hangeul, which makes Japanese the official language and annihilates Hangeul as the occupation period passes. Here, the repression of the Japanese rename(창씨개명)[55] and the Hangeul Research Society was an opportunity to increase its intensity.

Compilation of a country's dictionary can be said to be the best way to establish the language as the crystallization of language standard. That is why each country is striving to create and upgrade its own native language dictionary today. In this study, I would like to review the process of dictionary compilation for the preservation of the Korean language during the Japanese colonial period, and to study the development process after that. Through this, the Korean people, lost their national identity, tried to establish a new position as a movement for the preservation of national identity and independence at the colonial time.

II. Main Topic

In the process of forming the nation-state, the compilation of the national language dictionary plays a very important role. The first dictionary of this kind as a process of making the norm in the process of communication among members of the nation was published in 1694 as the Dictionary de l'Academie Francaise.[56] It was later than this, but Korea also opened the door to modern times in 1894 by implementing reforms as the basis for national official documents written in Korean. The era of Chinese writing disappeared from official writing, and the era of sharing and distributing knowledge in Korean, which is our writing, has opened. These changes have been linked to efforts to maintain and rediscover the nation-state.

However, the conversion of Hangeul only in the early days was not done immediately. Due to the influence of Chinese characters, which had been used for a long time, the argument that Korean

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[55] The goal of Japanese-style renaming was not to make Koreans and Japanese equal, but to draw the participation of Koreans needed to carry out the full-scale war. More than 80 percent of households in the country had changed their names by August 1940, when they promoted Japanese-style renaming. Failure to make a Japanese-style change of name penalized children for entering school, imposed physical sanctions such as reprimand and beatings, and penalized private institutions as well as government offices

[56] The Academy Française, which played a major role in the French's modern appearance, was founded in 1634. To establish the use of French and to standardize spelling, the institution submits the Academy Francaise's Opinion on Spelling(1673) and publishes the Academy Dictionary in 1694. This dictionary becomes the standard for the development of the French language later.

and Chinese characters should be used together was prevalent among intellectuals. Even at the official ceremony of the first decree of the Joseon Dynasty in 1994, there was a case in which Article 14 stated, "All laws and ordinances are based on Korean and a translation into Chinese or a mixture of Korean and Chinese." However, many enlightenment intellectuals who had a problem consciousness of mixing Korean and Chinese characters began to participate in the work of standardizing the Korean language. Various tasks related to standardization were raised by them, such as the unification of Korean notation, the collection and arrangement of the vast vocabulary that has been accumulated in Korean words, and the designation of the official language as the standard. The convergence of these tasks and research results eventually leads to a task in the era of Hangeul dictionary compilation.

As Japan's policy to make Chosun into a colony was revealed, Japanese became the national language, and Korean language became the language of the dominated nation. This can be confirmed in the course of changes in the Korean education order promulgated by Japan after the annexation of Korea and Japan. Japan announced the "Chosun Education Ordinance" in 1911 for colonial education in Chosun. This educational decree was later changed into the 2nd revised educational decree in 1922, the 3rd revised educational decree in 1938, and the 4th revised educational decree in 1943, and came into effect. The language policy in the Chosun Education Ordinance was consistently oriented toward the commercialization of Japanese. Therefore, not only textbooks, but also the language of education has been changed to Japanese, and Korean language education has become ineffective. Even when the Korean language was allowed as a regular course, it was excluded from the entrance examination course so that it did not attract the attention of students or parents. In Chosun, the Korean language was also driven out of schools in the stages of 'Korean language required-Japanese language required', 'Korean language selection-Japanese language required', and ' Korean language abolition-Japanese language required'. In a situation where the possibility of survival of the Korean language is becoming slim, more and more nationalists think that studying and educating the Korean language is to protect the spirit of Chosun.

In the ruins of the colony, the Korean Language Research Association (later renamed the Korean Language Society) was formed, and nationalists gathered. Like this, the intense consciousness of Korean language researchers to protect the national spirit became the driving force in restarting

the Korean language cleanup project, which was cut off after the Korean-Japanese annexation. And even though it was a time when the public sympathized with their thoughts and intentions and received colonial rule, the standardization of Korean language and the compilation of Korean language dictionaries established themselves as a national task in response to the whole society.

On October 9, 1947, the first volume of the Korean Dictionary was published. It was the moment when the Korean language dictionary compilation project, which had been carried out as a national project for the past 20 years, paid off for the first time. It was five years after the Koran Language Society was destroyed by the Korean Language Society incident, and two years after the Institute was rebuilt along with the liberation. Korean language reconstruction activities were carried out in the absence of incidents that would show the full picture of Korean language and the example of Korean writing during the Japanese colonial period. Of course, there was a Korean Dictionary compiled by Moon Se-young in 1938, but there was a desperate need for a normative dictionary that could support Korean language reconstruction activities through Korean language education and Japanese remnants. From 1929 to 1942, 13 years of compilation was required before and after liberation, and the dictionary was finally published. This dictionary was published in 6 volumes in 1957.

<First Korean Big Dictionary, published in 1947>

In 1929, the Korean Dictionary Compilation Society was formed for the first time. This incident, which involved a total of 108 promoters, could be said to be the culmination of the movement to restore national culture that began after the cultural rule of Japan at the time. The formation of the

Korean Dictionary Compilation Association was the result of the popular spread of linguistic nationalism, which became a trend in the study of Korean language after Ju Si-kyung. The Korean Language Research Society, which was created with Ju Si-kyung's disciples at the center, set the research direction by leaning on the linguistic nationalism of "Chosun language is our nation's spirit and our nation itself."

Even before the formation of the Korean Dictionary Compilation Association and prior preparation process, there was a movement for the compilation of Korean Dictionary. The Gwangmunhoe, a group of national enlightenment movements, initiated the compilation of <Malmoi> (pure Korean, dictionary) led by Ju Si-kyung and Kim Du-bong. This project, which started in 1911, has reached the stage of completing the manuscript, but it was not possible to complete the work as Ju Si-kyung died in 1914 and Kim Du-bong fled to China soon after. After more than 10 years passed after the Gwangmunhoe dictionary compilation project was stopped, the meaning of the dictionary compilation continued to the Keimyung Club, a gathering of intellectuals. However, even here, no progress has been made.

The lexicographic work started in this way entered a new phase from the mid-1930s, when the Japanese colonial policy began to become violent. After the use of the Korean language was banned from the official statue, the movement for compiling the Korean dictionary was a resistance to defending the Korean language, and it was recognized as a kind of independence movement.

Here is another peculiar early Korean dictionary. It was published the Korean-French Dictionary in France in 1880 by a French missionary for the missionary purposes, also the Korean-English Dictionary, published in Hoengbin, Japan by the hand of an American missionary Underwood in 1890, and the Korean-English Dictionary by the British missionary Gale in 1897, also published in Hoengbin, Japan. In 1920, the Korean language dictionary was published by the Korean government-general in Japanese explain. The characteristics of these dictionaries are that they were all published by foreigners, and were dictionaries that lacked uniformity in language and script.

The colonial government of the Chosun also planned and proceeded to publish the Korean dictionary. In April 1911, an investigation into the old system and culture of Chosun was conducted, and at this time, the Korean dictionary compilation project was also established and proceeded. During the Korean Empire, Hyun-eun and Eo Yoon-juck, who were members of the

Korean Literature Research Institute, participated in this project. After 10 years of work, it was published in 1920 under the name of Korean Dictionary. However, this dictionary was a Korean-language bilingual dictionary with Japanese meaning interpretation attached to the headwords in Korean. This, in turn, disproves that the ruler is nothing more than a tool for knowing the language and culture of the ruled people.

In fact, in order to learn Korean language, which is the dominant national language, Japanese officials have implemented a policy to encourage to learn Korean language. To this end, a governmental group called the "Kyungsung Korean Language Research Association" was organized to manage textbook development and Korean language training tests.

The Korean national language dictionary compilation project in Chosun was in a very different situation from that in the West. In the case of the West, dictionaries were compiled in the process of reorganizing the communication system of the modern nation-state from Latin to national language. As the demand for native language publications surged, the interests of printers and intellectuals met, and the native language dictionary was published with the support of the state, where national integration was a key task. However, in the case of Chosun, it was not possible to expect support from a large organization called the state, and therefore, it faced difficulties from securing a cause for the publication of the Korean dictionary.

The Korean Language Research Society, which served as a midwife in the launch of the Korean Dictionary Compilation Society, was established by those who inherited the will of Ju Si-kyung, who played a leading role in creating modern language norms, and it is clear that it was a key force in the modern linguistics reorganization project, but its activities were in colonial conditions. It was not enough to go beyond the limits of research activities under the language policy that the Korean Language Research Society can engage in is limited to the Korean spelling law, and the background of the Chosun Government-General did not give the absolute authority to lead the normalization of the Korean language.

In this situation, the Korean Language Research Society tried to secure the authority of the Korean language dictionary to be compiled in the future through public support. The organization of the Korean Language Dictionary Compilation Society, which encompasses not only famous people from all celebrities, but also people who are confronting with the Korean Language Research Society, was an expression of the will of the Korean Language Research Society to lead the

normalization of Korean language based on popular support. This is because if an authoritative Korean dictionary comes out without a full Korean dictionary, the spelling method and the words adopted by this dictionary will soon become the standard of Korean language.

The person who led this organization was Lee, Guk-ro (1893-1978), who returned to Korea in 1929 after obtaining a Ph.D. at Germany. With the role of Lee, Guk-ro, 108 famous Koreans[57] gathered at the Korean Dictionary Compilation Society, and the Korean language compilation project became a national project.

Even before the Korean Dictionary Compilation Association was made, there were some people who had a problem of creating a Korean dictionary. They tried to make the Korean language a language that can be expressed not only in words, but also in writing.

Let's look at the pioneers who took the lead in the full-fledged Korean dictionary compilation activity. First of all, there is Bong-woon Lee's <Korean Text>. The grammar system he proposed here is different from that of Western grammar studies. He used a mixture of classifying vocabulary according to meaning and grammatical categories such as parts of speech. This form is commonly referred to as the interpreter's grammar method, and it means the grammar that the interpreters who interpreted while learning and educating foreign languages, and this characteristic is considered to be contained in Lee's writings.

Ji, Seok-young (1855-1935) was also a scholar who helped to lay the foundation for the grammar of Chosun during the colonial era. In 1905, he created a new writing system, "Shinjeonggukmun," and appealed to the government. In addition, in 1907, he led the establishment of the "Korean Studies Association" and promoted collective research to establish the norm of the Korean language. In addition to the study of spelling, he focused on vocabulary collection and research on etymology, and the results were <Jajeonseokyo> and < Eunmun> published in 1909. Jajeonseokyo is a Chinese character written in Korean with sound and meaning written on the Chinese characters used at the time. Eunmun is a writing that presents sound and meaning about Chinese characters.

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[57] The promoters of the Korean Dictionary Compilation Society were basically nationalists, and most of them were intellectuals who had studied abroad, aiming for the values of Western civil society. These were bourgeois nationalists with some social and economic foundations, including thorough nationalists such as Ji-young Jang and Jae-hong Ahn, socialists such as Myung-hee Hong, Ki-moon Hong, and Sun-tak Lee, and Chi-ho Yun and Kwang-soo Lee, who advocated the theory of nationality reform.

The need to review Seok-young Ji's active Korean language research and proposals emerged, and the Korean Language Research Institute(국문연구소) was established as an institution to review them. Rather than developing something beyond the existing language characteristics, the Korean Language Research Institute focused its activities on grasping the language situation and characteristics of Chosun at the time and standardizing them. From this point of view, their final goal naturally boiled down to lexicography.

It was the teachers who formed one of the pillars of the Korean dictionary compilation. Of course, there were cases where the level of the dictionary they compiled remained at the level of the vocabulary, but teachers were able to collect vocabulary with strong use in the school field, and their meaning was relatively accurate, so their work served as the cornerstone of the later dictionary lexicon. A representative example of such a dictionary is Shim, Eui-rin's Korean Dictionary for Ordinary Schools (1925). This dictionary was the first dictionary to translate Korean headwords into Korean.

The Chosun Gwangmunhoe, founded by Nam-seon Choi in October 1910, was an institution that laid the foundation for lexical compilation during the Japanese colonial period. This lays the foundation for the Korean dictionary with the compilation of <Malmoi>. Prior to the compilation of the dictionary, Gwangmunhoe compiled a large-scale dictionary <Shinjajeon> because he thought that the arrangement of Chinese characters closely related to the Korean language was the basic work of compiling the Korean dictionary. Ju, Si-kyung and Kim, Doo-bong, who led this work at the time, sympathized with the necessity of a true dictionary compilation, and after about four years of effort from 1911, they completed a dictionary manuscript called <Malmoi>. However, the dream cannot come true due to the death of Ju, Si-kyung and Kim, Doo-bong's defection to North Korea.

<Korean movie clip on Malmoi>

The connection between the Korean Dictionary Compilation Project and the Korean Dictionary Compilation Circuit is undertaken by the Keimyung Club. In 1927, the Keimyung Club established a committee for lexical compilation and started raising funds. The pre-compilation plan is also announced before the Korean-language dictionary compilation and begins to prepare, naturally forming a confrontation with the Korean-language dictionary compilation.

Since then, as the activities of the Korean Language Society became the leading force, the Korean Language Dictionary Compilation Association naturally took the lead in the Korean language dictionary compilation. Among the people who intermittently participate in these activities, Lee, Sang-chun and Moon, Se-young donated or published their own dictionary. Lee, Sang-chun donated the results of his dictionary work on 90,000 headwords to the Korean Language Society, and Moon, Se-young published the <Korean Dictionary> in October 1938.

After some twists and turns, the Korean Language Society completed most of the manuscripts in 1939 and obtained permission for publication by the Korean Government-General. With the idea that Japanese already become the official language, the Chosun Governor-General, who judged that the Korean dictionary would not have much social significance, approved the dictionary compilation in 1940. Of course, in the process, negative heading words or content about Japan are constantly being instructed to be deleted. However, after a while, the incident of the Korean Language Society took place, and the Korean dictionary compilation was in vain.

During the rule of Chosun, Japan aimed to make Japanese a powerful language and to make it the

language that Koreans want to learn and use in life, education, and administration. To this end, Japanese was primarily made the official language to replace the Korean language. The reason why Korean language classes were allowed and the Korean language dictionary compilation was permitted was a result of the government-general's confidence in the strong spread of Japanese. The Chosun Governor-General thought that as long as Japanese exerts strong power and dominates Chosun society, the assimilation into the Japanese language would become natural.

Efforts to preserve the identity and native language of the colonial people finally came to fruition in 1947, after liberation. That is, the <Large Dictionary, 큰사전> was published two years after liberation. However, the dictionaries, which were scheduled to be published in a total of 6 volumes, were published in turn over the next 10 years. The second volume was published on May 5, 1949 as one of the South Korean dictionaries, and became the last dictionaries published in the state that the South and North had not yet been divided. After that, the Korean War (1950-1953) was fought, and researchers who worked together for pre-publishing also suffered the regret of being divided into North and South. In the South, the rest of the dictionaries were published in 1957 with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation in the United States, completing a total of six Korean dictionaries.[58]

At the time of publication of the third volume, the Korean Language Society was renamed to the Hangeul Research Society (한글학회, 1949), and the name of the dictionary was also changed to a large dictionary built by the Hangeul Research Society. The people of the Korean Language Society who went to the North gathered under the name of the Korean Language and Literature Research Society (조선어문연구회), and in October 1948, the compilation of the Korean Language Dictionary began. However, due to the Korean War, the activities of both sides were suspended. In the case of the North, it changed its direction to publishing a small dictionary instead of publishing the large, and in February 1956, the <Korean Small Dictionary> was published. In the South, the rest of the dictionaries were published in 1957 with the support of the Rockefeller

[58] In 2005, the 60th year of the division of the South and North Korea, the two Koreas decided to make a dictionary by gathering words that had been used in each country. This is the formation of the "Kyore Language Dictionary Joint Compilation Committee" on February 20, 2005. It created a "unification dictionary" that overcame the language disparity resulting from the division, and started a "national language dictionary" compilation project to make the words made in the lives of North and South Korea and overseas Koreans.

Foundation in the United States, completing a total of six Korean dictionaries.

After the draft of the dictionary was made and a long time passed, the work was carried out to include new words that were introduced with new cultures or were newly created in response to changes in the social environment. After liberation, as the remnants of the Japanese colonial rule were cleared and the language purification project was promoted, several quotes were omitted or deleted. Vocabularies such as "profanity, emergency power, and emperor" have been deleted, and many Japanese foreign languages have also been omitted. 'Taegeukgi (태극기)' was interpreted as 'the national flag of Korea (한때 한국의 국기)' in the first draft, but now it had to be changed to 'the flag of our country (우리나라의 국기)'.

III.   Conclusion

Despite the limitations of the colonial rule, it was not found in any nation under colonial rule that established an independent language arrangement plan and established it through the support of the national movement. This is evidence that the dictionary compilation project led by the Korean Language Society was playing a mediating role in expanding the area of activity of the forces of the national independent movement. In addition, it can be assessed that it was a genuine independence movement that did not stop even in the process of Japanese becoming an official language and making national dictionary project received support from the whole nation and the public rather than a specific group's activities. This unified effort continues today as a joint dictionary compilation project between South and North Korea.

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